Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney by Basanta, W. Eugene
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 63 | Issue 4 Article 5
1975
Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Basanta, W. Eugene (1975) "Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 63 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol63/iss4/5
NOTE
TA YLOR v. HA YES: A CASE STUDY IN THE USE OF
THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER AGAINST
THE TRIAL ATTORNEY
INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision in Taylor v. Hayes,' the United
States Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals,2 which had upheld the summary criminal
contempt conviction of Louisville attorney Daniel Taylor. This
summary contempt conviction was imposed by Jefferson Cir-
cuit Court Judge John Hayes during the much publicized 10-
day murder trial of Narvel and William Tinsley. Taylor repre-
sented Narvel Tinsley throughout the trial. At the close of the
October 1971 trial, Judge Hayes cited Taylor on nine counts of
contempt, punishing him with consecutive prison sentences
aggregating to 54 months, though subsequently the judge re-
duced the sentence to six months imprisonment. The resulting
litigation, culminating in the Supreme Court's ruling, brings
into focus the many problems associated with the use of sum-
mary contempt proceedings against defense attorneys. Moreo-
ver, in Taylor and in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,3 a decision
handed down on the same day, the Supreme Court ruled on
several significant procedural questions involving the summary
criminal contempt power. These cases thus provide an excel-
lent foundation on which to base a case study and general
survey of the use of summary contempt proceedings to punish
a defense attorney for his conduct during a trial.
I. THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER
The so called "inherent" judicial authority to punish an
418 U.S. 488 (1974).
494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973).
3 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
Kentucky decisions clearly consider the contempt power to be "inherent" in the
judiciary. See Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1972); Miller v. Stephenson, 474
S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1971); Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971); Levisa Stone
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individual summarily for criminal contempt of court is an
extraordinary power5 clearly open to abuse. Criminal contempt
is one form of contempt of court described as acts "done in
disrespect of the court or its process or which obstruct the
administration of justice or tend to bring the court into disre-
spect. ' 7 The distinguishing feature of criminal contempt is that
punishment is imposed for punitive purposes, while in other
contempt proceedings, punishment is meted out to coerce ac-
tion on the part of the alleged contemnor 5
Criminal contempt, like any contumacious offense, can be
either "direct" or "indirect." The former are those contempts
"committed in the immediate view and presence of the judge,"
while the latter are those "not committed in the judge's pres-
ence but at a distance."' In the case of a direct contempt,
Corp. v. Hays, 429 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1968). Early cases of importance include Capps
v. Gore, 21 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1929); Riley v. Wallace, 222 S.W. 1085 (Ky. 1920); Ri-
chardson v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W. 213 (Ky. 1911); French v. Commonwealth, 97
S.W. 27 (Ky. 1906); Underhill v. Murphy, 78 S.W. 482 (Ky. 1904); Arnold v. Common-
wealth, 80 Ky. 300 (1882); In re Woolley, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 95 (1874). For a very early
Kentucky case dealing with contempt charges against Henry Clay see Clay v. County
Court, 2 Ky. (1 Sneed) 189 (1802).
Note also that the legislative branch may possess a contempt power. See C. BECK,
CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS (1959). See also Ky. CONST. § 39 and Ky. REv. STAT. § 6.070 et
seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. Some have suggested that administrative
agencies should likewise have such a power to enforce subpoenas and other official
pronouncements. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, A SINIsTRATIvE LAW 560-61 (6th ed.
1974).
1 Note, Criminal Contempt in the Presence of the Court, 5 N. ENG. L. REv. 191,
192 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, 5 N. ENG. L. REv. 191].
The other major form of contempt is civil contempt. Civil contempts are".
contempts which consist in failure to do something which the contemnor is ordered by
the court to do for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding before
the court . . . " Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.2d 983, 985 (Ky. 1948). See also
Tabor v. Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson, 199 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1947).
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). This is the traditional definition
of criminal contempt. For a similar definition see Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.2d
983, 985 (Ky. 1948). See also Tucker v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1945);
Akins v. Peak, 40 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1931); Adams v. Gardner, 195 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1917);
Wages v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. Law Rptr. 925 (1892). It should also be observed that
the position of the Kentucky Court was that criminal contempt was not a "crime" as
such within the general legal definition. See Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky.
1959). However, the decision by the Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968), alters this position.
8 Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 239 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Dobbs].
I Note, 5 N. ENG. L. REv. 191, supra note 5, at 192-93. In Odom & Baker, Direct
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courts have often employed summary proceedings to punish
the alleged contemnor, either immediately or at the close of the
trial, following the verdict.'0 Summary action, in this context,
has been defined by the Supreme Court as:
[A] procedure which dispenses with the formality, delay and
digression that would result from the issuance of process,
service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking
evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission
of findings, and all that goes with a conventional trial."
Summary proceedings for direct contempt have thus been used
to suspend the normal procedural safeguards associated with
other criminal prosecutions. The summary contempt power
permits the judge citing for contempt to also adjudicate the
case and find the offender guilty without notice, a hearing or
the other rudimentary features which constitute due process of
law.
Although virtually all authorities concede that such a judi-
cial power poses a potential threat to basic constitutional re-
quirements of fairness and due process, 2 the traditional view
has been that this summary contempt power is an "inseparable
attendant" of every judicial tribunal, absolutely necessary for
the orderly administration of justice, as well as the mainte-
and Constructive Contempt, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 147 (1974), there is a helpful discussion
of the distinction between direct and indirect contempt.
,* The use of summary proceedings either at trial, immediately following the
violative conduct, or at the close of trial was first sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). The vitality of this decision has been
seriously eroded, however, by subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 462
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
12 Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion That Due Process
Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463,
464 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463]:
Summary procedure without hearing, for punishing direct contempts ap-
pears on analysis to violate fundamental norms of due process in that guilt
is determined and punishment inflicted without providing an opportunity to
prepare and present a defense before an impartial tribunal.
The leading cases in support of the view that due process does not require notice or a
hearing before another judge in cases of direct contempt are Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289 (1888) and Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). See also Fisher v. Pace, 336
U.S. 155 (1949). But see Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
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nance of judicial respect and the legal process. 3 Other authori-
ties have questioned and criticized the existence of the sum-
mary power, asserting not only that it is a wholly unnecessary
violation of basic tenets of our constitutional and legal philoso-
phy, and that other devices more effective in controlling the
courtroom and less violative of due process exist; but also that,
in any case, the summary contempt power exists only as an
historical aberration or accident."
"3 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1952). See also American College of
Trial Lawyers, Disruption of the Judicial Process, 75 CASE & CONI. no. 5, 28, 34 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as American Trial Lawyers Report]; Lane, The Contempt Power
v. the Concept of a Fair Trial, 50 Ky. L.J. 351, 380-84 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Lane].
,1 In N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT (1973) [hereinafter cited
as DISORDER], the summary contempt power, as well as other aspects of trial disrup-
tion and its control, are closely examined. At 232 et. seq., the conclusions of the authors
are outlined. It was concluded that this power is unnecessary and "performs no essen-
tial role in controlling misbehavior." Id. The study recommended that the summary
power be replaced with a system in which the trial judge cites for contempts before
him, with notice of the specific charges of misbehavior, but with a hearing before a
different judge on the issue of guilt or innocence. The study found that the central
defect in the summary contempt power is the power that it places in the trial judge.
The report, citing the Taylor case, concluded that fears of the arbitrary and unfair use
of this power have been warranted by empirical evidence. Id. at 233. See also Freund,
Disruption in Our Courts: Why?, 7 TRIAL no. 1, 12 (1971).
Other authorities critical of the summary contempt power include: Dobbs, supra
note 8; Hermann, Contempt: Sacrilege in the Judicial Temple-the Derivative Politi-
cal Trial, 60 Ky. L.J. 565, 591-605 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hermann]; Kutner,
Contempt Power: The Black Robe-A Proposal for Due Process, 39 TENN. L. REv. 1,
67-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kutner]; Note, Constitutional Law: The Supreme
Court Constructs a Limited Right to Trial by Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors,
1967 DUKE L.J. 632 [hereinafter cited as Note, 1967 DUKE L. J. 6321; Note, Attorneys
and the Summary Contempt Sanction, 25 ME. L. REV. 89 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Note, 25 ME. L. REV. 89]; Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463; Note, Criminal Law-
Contempt- Conduct of Attorney During Course of Trial, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 329 [here-
inafter cited as Note, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 329].
In Green v. United States, speaking of the power of a judge to punish summarily,
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, commented:
It seems inconsistent with the most rudimentary principles of our system of
criminal justice, a system carefully developed and preserved throughout the
centuries to prevent oppressive enforcement of oppressive laws to concen-
trate this much power in the hands of any officer of the state.
356 U.S. 165, 198 (1958).
In State ex rel. Asbaugh v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 193, 194-95 (Wis. 1897), the
court, in an often cited comment, looked upon such a power as the "nearest akin to
despotic power of any power existing under our form of government."
There has been considerable discussion of the historical emergence of the sum-
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The power to institute summary proceedings for contempt
has its most telling effect upon trial attorneys, 5 particularly
criminal defense attorneys, for it is very rare that a trial judge
will hold a prosecutor in contempt."6 The defense lawyer in our
system is assigned dual and potentially conflicting roles. He is
bound to vigorously and persistently uphold the rights of his
client, providing that client with the best defense he can mus-
ter within the bounds of the law.' 7 At the same time, tradition
has labeled the defense attorney an "officer of the court." Al-
though this is a vague and largely undefined term," court deci-
mary contempt power. Studies indicate that this power arose in rather recent times
(18th century) and that previously, contemptuous conduct was often dealt with like
any other criminal offense. Kutner at 3-7. See also R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER
(1963); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempt
in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010
(1924).
Justice Black also discusses the historical evolution of the summary procedure for
contempts in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 213-20 (1958). See also Justice
Goldberg's dissent in United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964) for some
historical background as to the contempt power.
In the area of criminal contempt, courts have had difficulty distinguishing be-
tween substantive guilt and procedural due process for the accused contemnor. In
Sacher v. United States, Justice Frankfurter made it clear in his dissenting opinion
that a court's primary concern in the area of criminal contempt should be with the
procedure employed to determine guilt or innocence. 343 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1952). A some-
what similar position is taken by Justice White in his opinion in the Taylor case. In
contrast, Lane, supra note 13, at 387-88, seems to feel emphasis should be placed on
the contemnor's guilt rather than on the procedure followed to assess the guilty. But
see Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954).
13 Many of the important cases dealing with criminal contempts involve trial
attorneys. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230
(1962); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949).
See also In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974).
11 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 186-87. But see Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974) (a prosecutor cited for contempt during
a criminal trial).
17 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmiTY, Canon 7 (A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law). See also Ethical Con-
sideration 7-4 et seq. (Duty of the Lawyer to a Client); Ethical Consideration 7-19
et seq. (Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice). Ethical Considera-
tion 7-36 discusses the balancing of the need for zealous representation with the need
for maintaining the decorum and dignity of the proceedings. See also Disciplinary
Rules 7-106(c) (6)-(7).
11 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 144. See also Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S.
399, 405 n.3 (1956). For an interesting article in this area see Garry, Who's an Officer
1975]
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sions reveal that this role is a very real one for trial attorneys,
one which can, according to some courts, serve to limit the
vigor of the attorney's defense of his client.19 These conflicting
responsibilities can potentially place the attorney in an unten-
able position requiring him to in some manner violate his duty
as an officer of the court in order to faithfully fulfill his role as
an advocate, or vice versa." Viewing these conflicting duties in
the context of the summary contempt power, the potential for
abuse and the danger of actual harm to a vigorous defense
become apparent. One commentator has concluded that in an
adversary legal system such as ours, "[t]he role of counsel as
advocate requires particularistic limitations on the exercise of
the summary contempt power to minimize the threat of intimi-
dation which stifles vigorous and effective advocacy and
impedes the policy of independence of the bar."'' z While un-
doubtedly it is true that a judge needs certain powers to control
the conduct of attorneys, 22 nevertheless:
It is one thing to hold that a lawyer whose role in the legal
system may demand that he risk contempt, may be punished
if he goes beyond the ephemeral boundary of effective and
of the Court?, 7 TIAL no. 1, 18 (1971).
,1 Huggins v. Field, 244 S.W. 903, 905 (Ky. 1922). In the case of Fisher v. Pace,
336 U.S. 155 (1949), the Court indicated that in assessing the propriety of a defense
attorney's conduct, his position as an officer of the court must not be lost sight of. In
his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, emphasized the alternative
role of the attorney as the "resourceful lawyer" defending his client with zeal. Id. at
166.
2 Note, 25 ME. L. REV. 89, supra note 14, at 93. See also Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv.
329, supra note 14, at 343, where it is stated:
This dual mandate may, however, thrust the trial lawyer into a situation
which requires that he risk breach of one or the other of his obligations.
Unfortunately, the moment at which zealous advocacy becomes contuma-
cious conduct is no more certain than the point at which deference to the
value of order becomes abdication as advocate.
21 Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, supra note 14, at 334-35. See also Disruption in
Our Courts: Why?, 7 TRL&.L no. 1, 12 (1971). In one recent article the argument is made
that affording the defense attorney involved in a trial contempt due process rights of
notice and a hearing might prejudice his client by denying him his sixth amendment
right to a "speedy trial." Comment, The Application of Criminal Contempt Procedures
to Attorneys, 64 J. CUi t. L. C. & P.S. 300 (1973). While this argument is interesting,
it is also incorrect since any hearing permitted would necessarily follow completion of
the client's own trial.
22 Lane, supra note 13, at 384.
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vigorous advocacy; it is another thing altogether to hold that
the guilt of one in the position of an attorney may be deter-
mined by the accuser, without notice, hearing or an oppor-
tunity to defend.?
Moreover, the argument that the summary power is neces-
sary to control the courtroom actions of defense attorneys is
belied by empirical evidence. The fact is that instances of
courtroom misconduct by attorneys are rare, and in those cases
where attorney misconduct has occurred, the difficulties have
perhaps arisen as much from the nature of the case or the
actions of the trial judge, as from the conduct of defense coun-
sel.Y
Not only may the threat of a summary contempt convic-
tion impede a lawyer's advocacy, but a conviction may carry
with it the potential for further discipline by other members of
the bar, "the ramifications of which may far exceed those of the
legal sanction,"" and may result in the suspension of the law-
yer's right to practice.26 Finally, a summary contempt convic-
Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, supra note 14, at 343.
24 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 6-9, 131-32, 200-205. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 3A.
2 Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, supra note 14, at 352. Daniel Taylor was disciplined
by the Kentucky Bar Association but not in connection with the Tinsley case. See
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1972).
The use of bar discipline to control attorney conduct or to punish for previous
conduct is discussed in DISORDER, supra note 14, at 159-62. That study concluded:
As a general matter we think it is undesirable . . . to initiate disciplinary
action against a lawyer for his behavior in a single hotly contested case ...
If a lawyer exceeded the bounds of proper behavior in a single case, the most
appropriate remedy may be contempt before a different judge from the one
who heard the case. If his actions were consistently outrageous throughout
the trial with no mitigating circumstances, disciplinary action (though not
disbarment) may then properly be taken. Or if a lawyer's behavior occurs in
more than one trial, it may show his unfitness to practice.
Id. at 162. The report cites the Taylor disciplinary case as one of two cases it found in
which a lawyer was severely penalized by the bar for misconduct in a single case. In
Taylor's case, the bar imposed a five year suspension on Taylor. The Court of Appeals,
adopting a posture similar to that set out in DISORDER, felt that the issue in the case
involved but one trial and that disbarment or a substantial period of suspension was
inappropriate. The Court felt Taylor should not be made a "scapegoat." 495 S.W.2d
737, 747 (Ky. 1973).
21 Suspension of the right to practice law was a disciplinary technique which Judge
Hayes sought to use against Taylor. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the
Judge's claimed authority to so act. 494 S.W.2d at 747. The Court cited Adams v.
19751
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tion may damage the attorney's reputation and thus harm his
legal practice.
The problems encountered in the post-verdict discipline of
a trial attorney through the use of summary contempt proceed-
ings are dramatically illustrated in Taylor v. Hayes. The diffi-
culties arising in this or any case involving the use of summary
contempt against trial counsel include: (1) a determination of
whether the attorney's conduct was in fact contemptuous
within the meaning of the law; (2) whether there exist due
process rights for the allegedly contumacious attorney requir-
ing that he receive notice of the specific charges against him
and a hearing at which he may speak in his own behalf before
a judge other than the one who has accused him of contempt;
and (3) whether under the circumstances, the attorney is con-
stitutionally or statutorily entitled to a jury determination of
his guilt or innocence.
Taylor v. Hayes dealt with all of these issues. The briefs
of the parties and the decisions set out by the various courts
in the case present a ready source for a study of the present
status of the law of summary contempt and its use against the
trial advocate. The remainder of this note will examine and
analyze this area of the law through this particular case, an
effort necessitating a detailed look at its factual background.
II. TAYLOR v. HAYES: THE FACTS
Taylor's contempt conviction arose out of events occurring
Gardner, 195 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1917), to support its view.
In DISORDER, supra note 14, at 163-64, the issue of suspension as a disciplinary tool
is raised. The study points out that both the American Trial Lawyers Report, supra
note 13, and the ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN DEALING WITH TRIAL DISRUPTIONS, recommend the use of
suspension as a means of controlling attorney courtroom conduct. The rationale ad-
vanced to support such action is that since the trial judge could, on his own, imprison
the contumacious attorney for six months, he should also be able to suspend the
attorney for a similar period.
The authors of DISORDER reject this device. They offer several reasons for doing
so: (1) the same judge who hears the case should not adjudicate contempt charges or
suspend since this violates impartiality; (2) the legal problems connected with suspen-
sion are numerous-a court has no inherent power to suspend and the right to practice
law is constitutionally protected; and (3) other procedures exist to handle the few cases
of attorney misconduct which arise.
[Vol. 63
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during the trial of the Tinsley brothers, Narvel and William,
for the murder of two Louisville police officers. The Tinsleys
were both young and black; the police officers were both white.
During the trial, which lasted from October 18, 1971 through
October 29, 1971, Taylor represented Narvel Tinsley. The trial
engendered considerable public interest and was the focus of
substantial local press coverage.27 At various times as the trial
progressed, Judge Hayes informed Taylor, either in chambers
or outside the hearing of the jury, that he was in contempt. In
some cases Taylor was permitted to respond to these citations
for the record; in other instances response was denied. Several
times during the proceedings counsel for William Tinsley
moved for a severance of the cases due to antagonistic defense
claims and because it was felt that Taylor's actions were
prejudicial to William's defense. Likewise, Taylor moved for
severance based on the theory that the brothers' defenses were
antagonistic. These motions were uniformly denied by Judge
Hayes.
At the conclusion of the trial, after the jury had found both
brothers guilty, Judge Hayes, in the jury's presence summoned
Taylor before the court and severely criticized his conduct,
integrity and ability as counsel. Denying Taylor any opportu-
nity to respond and threatening to gag him if he persisted
in his attempts to do so, Judge Hayes, in what was surely the
emotional culmination of a heated and at times bitter trial,
summarily convicted Taylor on nine counts of criminal con-
tempt, on two counts of which the sentences were a year in
prison. All sentences imposed were, by the judge's order, to be
served consecutively. Thus linked, the sentences totaled 54
months imprisonment. Taylor was then placed in jail.
28
Subsequently, Judge Hayes refused to hold a bail hearing.
It was only after the Court of Appeals of Kentucky ordered such
a hearing that one was held. Taylor was not permitted to be
present at the hearing conducted by Judge Hayes and bail was
denied. Bail was finally ordered by the Court of Appeals.
Shortly thereafter, on November 4, 1971, Judge Hayes entered
27 For a discussion of press coverage and its impact on trial disruptions see
DISORDER, supra note 14, at 253-54.
For the text of Judge Hayes' comments at the close of the trial see note 177 infra.
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an order prohibiting Taylor from further practice before his
court.
Several weeks after Taylor filed an appeal with the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, 29 the trial judge moved to correct his
original judgment. This motion was granted and Judge Hayes
proceeded to change the first contempt citation to a warning
and to reduce the punishment under the eighth and ninth cita-
tions from one year to six months, thereby making all the
sentences six months or less. The corrected judgment, unlike
the original, did not specify that the individual sentences were
to be served consecutively.
In his appellate brief, Taylor claimed that: (1) his actions
did not constitute criminal contempt; (2) Judge Hayes was so
biased as to not be able to impartially sit in judgment on the
charges; (3) he had been denied an opportunity for a hearing
and to speak in his own defense; and (4) by state law and
constitutional right, his guilt or innocence should have been
determined by a jury.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, although denying Judge
Hayes' claimed power to exclude Taylor from practicing in his
court, substantially affirmed the trial court's summary action
in its decision handed down March 23, 1973.11 The single signif-
icant alteration the Court made was to rule that the sentences
imposed were to be served concurrently under Kentucky law,
since the corrected order did not specify how the separate sen-
tences were to run. This resulted in an imposed sentence of six
months, indicating, the Court stated, that a jury trial was not
constitutionally mandated. The Kentucky Court further de-
cided, in the process of denying Taylor the right to the inter-
vention of a jury, that a Kentucky statutory provision in this
area was unconstitutional. 31 The Court wholly rejected Taylor's
assertion that his acts were not contemptuous. Further, Com-
missioner Catinna ruled that any right Taylor had to a hearing
or to speak in his own defense had been satisfied by Judge
For a discussion of Kentucky law on the right to appeal a contempt conviction,
see note 109 infra.
30 494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973).
3, KRS § 432.260 (1972). The text of this statute and a discussion of the Court's
ruling on it can be found with the text following note 265 infra.
[Vol. 63
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Hayes. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge
Hayes had evidenced no bias against Taylor and was qualified
to sit in judgment of Taylor's guilt or innocence.
On June 15, 1973, the Court denied Taylor's petition for a
rehearing, but stayed execution of the sentence for a 90-day
period while Taylor sought Supreme Court review of his case
by petition for Writ of Certiorari. During this time the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals sustained the Tinsley conviction, find-
ing that Taylor's actions had not prejudiced the case,3 al-
though the Court, in deciding Taylor's case, regarded his con-
duct as outrageous and highly offensive.
Taylor filed his petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Septem-
ber 12, 1973. On December 3 of that year, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Taylor's case as to the following issues:
1. When a trial judge summarily imposes consecutive sen-
tences on eight counts of contempt aggregating four and one-
half years' imprisonment, including sentences of one year's
imprisonment on two counts, whether he, or the appellate
court may subsequently, in order to defeat the alleged con-
temnor's right to trial by jury, reduce the sentences so that
the sentence on no one count exceeds six months' imprison-
ment and direct that the sentences run concurrently for a
total of six months' imprisonment?
2. When alleged contempts have been committed by an at-
torney in the presence of the trial judge and the trial judge
proceeds summarily to punish for contempt, whether due
process requires that the attorney be given some opportunity
to be heard in defense or mitigation before he is finally ad-
judged guilty and sentence is imposed?
3. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the trial judge
could impartially sit in judgment on multiple contempt
charges against petitioner?33
In his brief to the Court, Taylor argued that he was enti-
tled to a jury trial to determine his guilt or innocence and that
due process required that he be given notice of the charges
32 495 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1973). The Court indicated that Taylor's conduct in de-
fending Narvel was not prejudicial to his brother and that the Judge had not expressed
any bias against Taylor such as to prejudice Narvel's rights. Id. at 785.
- 414 U.S. 1063 (1973).
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against him and an opportunity to be heard in his own behalf.
He also asserted that Judge Hayes could not sit in judgment
of his case because he was not an impartial arbiter.
Judge Hayes responded that he was properly the judge in
the case and that he was in no sense disqualified by any bias
or hostility toward Taylor. The Judge further contended that
Taylor had been afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard
at trial and that, in any case, notice and a hearing in such a
situation were not constitutionally guaranteed. Finally, Judge
Hayes maintained that Taylor was in no sense entitled to trial
by jury.
A number of amicus briefs were filed with the Court in
support of Taylor's cause. These briefs, along with Taylor's,
urged the Court to closely scrutinize the summary contempt
power and, in light of accepted standards of due process and
fairness, to discard this outdated and highly questionable de-
vice.
The Supreme Court reversed Taylor's conviction and re-
manded the case to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. But the
Court's opinion, as its grant of certiorari foretold, was not the
sweeping reexamination and disposal of the summary con-
tempt power pressed upon it by the petitioner and those sup-
porting him. Nevertheless, the Court did make some important
decisions in the case. The Court's decisions in the problem
areas outlined above will be explored and developed in an effort
to reflect the present status of the law dealing with important
aspects of the summary contempt power.
I. IS THE ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT CONTEMpruoUs
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LAW?
The initial issue in a case of a trial attorney's alleged con-
tempt of court is whether his actions were indeed contemp-
tuous.
It is often stated that four elements must exist in order to
support a summary contempt conviction under the federal or
equivalent state statutes. There must be "misbehavior";
such misbehavior must be in the court's presence; it must
"obstruct the administration of justice"; and there must be
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some sort of intent by the defendant to obstruct. 4
The concern here is with the latter two elements: "obstruction"
and the "intent to obstruct." Intimately connected with these
two requirements for contemptuous conduct is the concept of
"good faith," which may itself function as an element to be
considered in determining if an attorney's conduct during trial
has in fact been contumacious.
A. Obstruction
It is generally claimed that the attorney's conduct must be
"obstructive" in order to be contemptuous. This element is
troublesome and one which has been frequently debated by
both courts and commentators. The crux of the problem con-
cerns the meaning of "obstruction" and the distinction be-
tween attorney conduct which is legitimate, through forceful
and strenuous argument in his client's behalf, and conduct
which goes beyond this point, becoming disruptive of the judi-
cial process. Although the line dividing these two areas is un-
deniably indistinct, the fact remains that in order to be con-
temptuous an attorney's conduct must be found to be obstruc-
tive.
There are three major types of attorney conduct which
most often lead to contempt citations. These include: (1) dis-
respectful conduct or remarks by the attorney, (2) disobedience
of a court order or procedural directive, and (3) the pressing of
excessive or repetitive argumentation after the court's ruling on
the matter. While these are the three most common sources of
trial attorney contempt citations, none is per se contemptuous,
because in each case the attorney's action must obstruct the
administration of justice in order to be contumacious.
In the area of disrespectful statements or conduct by an
attorney before the court, some dispute has arisen as to
whether "mere disrespect" by an attorney is contemptuous.
Decisions by the Supreme Court and other courts seem to indi-
cate that mere disrespect without obstruction is not contemp-
tuous. In the case of Brown v. United States," the Supreme
34 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 106.
35 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Court remarked: "[Trial courts no doubt must be on guard
against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction
of the administration of justice" calling for punishment by the
use of the contempt power. 6
In another Supreme Court decision, Harney v. Craig,7 the
Court set forth the idea that "[t]he vehemence of the language
used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for con-
tempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The
danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immedi-
ately imperil."3 The Court added that the law of contempt was
not formulated for overly sensitive judges, and that judges
should be "men of fortitude able to thrive in a hardy climate." 9
In more recent decisions, the Court has further indicated
that mere disrespect, absent obstruction and an actual threat
to the administration of justice, is not contemptuous. In the
case of In re McConnell,0 the Court stated: "The arguments of
a lawyer in presenting his client's case strenuously and persist-
ently cannot amount to a contempt of court so long as the
lawyer does not in some way create an obstruction which blocks
the judge in the performance of his judicial duty."4' Another
case in which the Court emphasized the need for obstruction
of justice before an attorney's conduct could be found contemp-
tuous is In re Little," a 1972 decision involving a pro se criminal
defense. The Court made it clear that so long as the defen-
dant's remarks in conducting his own defense did not actually
disrupt the court proceedings or constitute an imminent danger
to the administration of justice, he could not be held in con-
tempt merely for his statements in summation that the court
was biased and had prejudged the case. Citing its decisions in
McConnell, Harney, Brown and Holt v. Virginia,4 3 the Su-
preme Court concluded that an attorney's language though
36 Id. at 153.
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
Id. at 376.
3I Id.
40 370 U.S. 230 (1962).
41 Id. at 236. Of particular importance are the Court's comments at 234-36.
42 404 U.S. 553 (1972).
381 U.S. 131 (1965).
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forceful and at times vehement, is not in itself contemptuous
absent an actual threat to the proper conduct of the judicial
process."
Some federal courts have taken the stance that mere dis-
respect by an attorney in stating his case is not contumacious
unless it blocks the judicial proceedings. A case of particular
importance here is the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United
States v. Seale." The court, in dealing with contempt citations
arising out of the highly publicized and criticized "Chicago
Seven" trial, expressed the -view that an actual obstruction of
justice and "immediate interruption" of the proceedings,
clearly disruptive of the judicial process, must occur before an
attorney may be cited for contempt. The Seventh Circuit em-
phasized that disrespect alone should not be viewed as con-
temptuous: "[T]he Supreme Court seems to have expressed
a high degree of tolerance in distinguishing disrespect from
obstruction. A showing of imminent prejudice to a fair and
dispassionate proceeding is therefore necessary to support a
contempt based upon mere disrespect or insult."4
This same court, in another decision arising out of the
contempt citations imposed during the "Chicago Seven" trial,
In re Dellinger,17 even more explicitly dealt with the issue of
attorney conduct and disrespect. The court indicated that al-
though the McConnell case "cannot be read as an immuniza-
tion for all conduct undertaken by an attorney in good faith
representation of his client, . . . [it] does require that attor-
neys be given great latitude in the area of vigorous advocacy."4
The court then went on to discuss its views on attorney dis-
respect.
[M]ere disrespect or insult cannot be punished where it does
not involve an actual and material obstruction. This is par-
ticularly true with respect to attorneys where the "heat of
courtroom debate" may prompt statements which are ill-
considered and might later be regretted. . . Substantial
" 404 U.S. at 555.
4 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 370.
" 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 398.
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freedom of expression should be tolerated in this area ...
However . . . although it is elusive, there is a line beyond
which disrespect becomes obstruction. When the remarks
create an imminent prejudice to a fair and dispassionate pro-
ceeding, that line has been crossed.49
The court summarized its position regarding the scope of per-
missible attorney conduct and the issue of disrespect with the
statement: "Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous,
contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing ob-
noxious, when acting in their client's behalf."5
Another recent federal court decision which in part con-
cerns the issue of disrespect and obstruction is Weiss v. Burr.5'
Here the contempt citations were leveled against a prosecuting
attorney in a criminal case. This Ninth Circuit decision clearly
acknowledged that a court does not have "unfettered discretion
to punish attorneys for allegedly contemptuous conduct. ' 52
Noting that "[a] court cannot deprive attorneys of their lib-
erty or property in order to avert perceived threats to the ad-
ministration of justice if the court's actions would unduly im-
pair legitimate, nondisruptive advocacy, 5 3 the court dismissed
part of the contempt citation because it believed the attorney's
conduct was not contemptuous. The circuit court based its
conclusion on the fact that certain of the attorney's allegedly
violative remarks were not by law contemptuous, since there
was no disrespect involved and his remarks did not actually
disrupt the trial or imperil the administration of justice. In
disallowing these contempt citations the court seemed to indi-
cate, as did the court in Dellinger, that obstruction must result
from the attorney's remarks before there can be a contempt
citation.
The concern with the issue of obstruction versus disrespect
reflects the problem of balancing the attorney's role as an advo-
cate with the need to insure the effective functioning of the trial
process. Fearing that judges may' iead attorneys' remarks as
4' Id. at 400. See also Dobbs, supra note 8, at 204-05.
50 461 F.2d at 400.
51 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973).




insulting and contemptuous, and that this may unduly hamper
the attorney in carrying out his role, these court decisions have
emphasized that an attorney's remarks, in addition to being
disrespectful, must be disruptive and obstructive in order to be
contemptuous. This is not to minimize the need for respect-a
duty owed by the attorney to the court, not a mere courtesy.
However, these federal courts, recognizing the practicalities of
our adjudicatory system, have established that breach of this
duty through mere disrespect, without resultant obstruction of
justice, should not be punished by the use of the summary
contempt power.
Commentators in recent years have likewise held to the
view that attorney disrespect, unaccompanied by obstruction,
should not result in contempt citations. Thus, one writer has
observed: "There is increasing support for the proposition that
a distinction between obstructive and disrespectful conduct
should be made, and that the use of the contempt power should
be confined to the former type of conduct."54 Another writer has
stated: "[I]t should be emphasized that mere personal insult
or irritating conduct should not readily be accepted as con-
tempt."5 It has also been said that: "To be contemptuous the
attorney must exceed the outermost limits of his proper role
and hinder rather than facilitate the search for truth."58
The recent report of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Disorder in the Court, discussed at some length
the issues of obstruction and attorney disrespect. The study
rightfully emphasized the need for the trial advocate to con-
duct himself respectfully in the courtroom in recognition of the
position of responsibility which he occupies and the need for
continued public respect and confidence in our system of jus-
tice. -" Although the study concluded that "[b]oth direct in-
sults and disrespectful comments by a lawyer can be
punishable, 5 1 the issue in this regard is one of obstruction as
51 Hermann, supra note 14, at 591.
5 Dobbs, supra note 8, at 208.
5, Note, 25 ME. L. REV. 89, supra note 14, at 93-94.
7 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 149. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, supra note 17 (particularly Ethical Consideration 7-36).
11 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 150.
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a result of this sort of conduct. The study indicated that ob-
struction of justice is a standard element of a contemptuous
offense and pointed to several of the recent court decisions
discussed above to support the view that mere disrespect by an
attorney without some actual disruption is not contemptuous.
"In recent years," the study stated, "courts have become more
tolerant of isolated instances of disrespect, often noting that
insulting language that does not obstruct the trial should not
be punished as contempt." 9 The conclusions of the study on
the issues of disrespect and obstruction by attorneys are pre-
sented in the form of a judge's response to the study commit-
tee's questionnaire.
So far as attorneys are concerned, nothing should be done to
limit even the most aggressive defense, provided that that
which is done is not directed to obstruction of the proceed-
ings. A "normal" amount of "judge baiting" is permissible,
as a stock in trade of the lawyer. Only when these limits are
continually transgressed should the contempt power be used
(it should be used sparingly and only under the direct provo-
cation for in a contempt proceeding the judge usually turns
out to be the defendant). Patience, a most difficult attribute
in these days of demand for instant justice must be cultivated
by the judge to an unusual degree."
The conclusion can be reached that although respectful
conduct by the trial attorney is important in the courtroom,
when the attorney, in the pursuit of his legitimate goals as an
advocate of his client's cause, offends the court's sensibilities
or insults the judge in some manner, this action is not contemp-
tuous unless it actually disrupts the trial and obstructs justice.
Clearly, the facts of each case will necessarily have to be con-
sidered to determine if the particular conduct was contuma-
cious.
As noted earlier, there are two other types of attorney con-
duct which result in imposition of the contempt sanction. One
of these occurs when the attorney disobeys a court's ruling or
procedural directive; the other is when the attorney makes re-
petitive or excessive argumentation of a particular point after
Id.
" Id. at 152.
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the judge has excluded the matter or otherwise ruled on it. In
both of these situations the attorney may be held in contempt.
Here too, however, the court should be mindful that obstruc-
tion of justice is required before such actions can be punished
by way of contempt.
Disobedience of rulings and procedural orders set down by
the trial court is, of necessity, improper conduct by the attor-
ney. "A lawyer may not disobey a valid rule of procedure or a
proper order of the court."'" In both the Seale and Dellinger
cases, the federal appeals court discussed the problem of diso-
bedience of court directives and orders. The court in Seale
remarked:
[Flailure to heed the directive of the court to desist from
arguing, to sit down, or to remain quiet may indeed consti-
tute an actual material obstruction to the administration of
justice. . . .As governor of the trial, the trial judge must
have the authority necessary to ensure the orderly and ex-
peditious progress of the proceedings. His directives in exer-
cise of this authority must be obeyed; otherwise the clear
result would be courtroom chaos. Wholly arbitrary limits on
argument will, if prejudicial, merit reversal of the substantive
case, but that hardly can excuse open defiance of the court's
commands. . . We do not say that automation-like reflex-
ive obedience to the court's orders is necessary to avoid a
contempt citation. The law does not expect unhuman [sic]
responsiveness. But where the directive is clear, the judge's
insistence on obedience is not undercut by his further rejoin-
der, and the party directed understands what is being asked
of him, he must obey."
The court in the Dellinger case likewise stressed that an
attorney cannot continually press a point after the judge has
ruled on the matter. The attorney, the court felt, can preserve
his point for appeal, but he cannot openly defy the court's
orders governing argument or procedural matters, even if the
order might be erroneous. 3 As noted in the Seale case, disobe-
dience of a court directive or order may become obstructive and
I Id.
" 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972).
461 F.2d 389, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1972).
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therefore contemptuous. The necessary implication, however,
is that not every disobedience is obstructive and hence con-
temptuous. This is well illustrated by a statement made by the
Ninth Circuit in the Weiss case:
The mere transgression of an order governing trial procedures
is, however, almost invariably insufficient to sustain a con-
tempt conviction. Due process requires, we think, something
more serious than a minor disagreement such as may often
and understandably follow an attorney's failure strictly to
comply with this type of order, before a contempt citation can
be issued. . . .In general, the misconduct must entail a per-
sistent disregard for the court's authority that the attorney
could have avoided through a reasonable good faith ef-
fort ...
It is often difficult for an attorney to strike an effective
accommodation between his client's interests and his obliga-
tions to meet the demands of the judge before whom he must
argue his case. Consequently, when, in attempting to reach
an appropriate compromise, one transgresses a court order,
he is not necessarily guilty of contempt. 4
These opinions indicate that a mere transgression of a court's
order or procedural ruling committed by counsel in good faith,
while attempting to argue his case, is not in itself contemp-
tuous. But if by so acting, the attorney obstructs justice, in
clear disregard of the court's authority, then his conduct may
be viewed as contumacious.65
The third type of trial conduct which often leads to con-
tempt citations is repetitive or excessive argumentation on the
part of the advocate. Disorder in the Court discussed this area
of the law in some detail.66 As this study notes, excessive argu-
ment by an attorney or the continued repetition of a point
already raised and ruled upon can be disruptive and hence
punishable. Thus, in the report's words, the attorney "may
make any point he wishes so long as he does so courteously and
at 484 F.2d 973, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1973). See also State v. Pokini, 521 P.2d 668
(Hawaii 1971).
65 For a case illustrative of the problem see In re Charbonneau, 116 Cal. Rptr. 153
(Ct. App. 1974).
16 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 155-57.
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in good faith. He may argue the question fully and preserve his
record for appeal. But if he continues after all these conditions
are met, he is obstructing the proceedings and can be properly
punished for contempt." 7 Emerging from the report is the con-
clusion that use of the contempt power simply because the
attorney's argument is novel, time consuming, or perhaps an-
noying to the judge, is not justified, for, absent obstruction, all
of this is permissible conduct." In order for the attorney's argu-
ments to be contemptuous they must overstep the bounds of
legitimate advocacy and become, by their excessive nature,
defiant and obstructive. Finally, it should be recognized that
part of the problem surrounding both an attorney's excessive
argument on a point and his disobedience of a court order may
arise not only from the attorney's conduct, but from the con-
duct of the judge as well. Remarks by the judge about the
attorney, his skill, his integrity and so on, as well as judicial
interference with the arguments of the attorney, may well
cause counsel to disobey the judge or continually repeat his
arguments either out of frustration or in an attempt to alter the
court's view. In any case, judicial misconduct can at times play
some role in courtroom disorder. 9
In sum, it appears that simply because counsel's language
or actions may appear insulting or because he violates a court's
order or continues to argue a point raised and ruled on pre-
viously should not mean that the attorney is automatically
found to be in contempt. His conduct in any of these situations
must be something more than merely disrespectful, in violation
of a judge's directive, or excessive. It must disrupt the trial,
obstruct justice and hinder the effort to discover the truth.
B. Intent
Obstruction itself, according to many courts and commen-
tators, is not the only necessary element of contempt. The al-
leged contemnor must also have intended in some manner to
disrupt the proceedings. "Deliberate intent on the part of an





attorney in pursuing a course of improper argument or prohib-
ited conduct has been deemed necessary to justify the con-
tempt citation."7" Nevertheless, courts often disregard this fac-
tor or are simply unaware of any intent requirement. 71 Further-
more, some courts, while acknowledging the element of intent
as part of a contumacious offense, determine its presence
merely by relying upon the assumption that one intends the
"natural consequences" of his own actions.72 Failure to consider
intent in holding an attorney in contempt has unfortunate re-
sults, for it "could serve to seriously impede effective advocacy
of lawyers and subvert the independence of the bar if lawyers
were subject to contempt charges based on zealousness and no
more. 17  Fearing such a result, it has been urged that "[a]
more rigid insistence on the intent requirement for criminal
contempt punishment is needed.
'7
Part of the difficulty with the intent factor is that the
meaning of the word "intent" is uncertain. In one sense, the
word may indicate a need to look at the subjective thoughts
and considerations which motivated the alleged contemnor's
conduct. In another sense, however, the word may simply mean
that one measures the supposed contemnor's conduct against
some standard to see if it can be concluded that the obstructing
conduct was intentional. In addition, as pointed out in
Disorder in the Court, there is a lack of judicial clarity in this
area, with courts taking vacillating and, at times, contradic-
tory positions. 75 Because of these problems, this study con-
cluded: "Although we recognize that 'intent' is sometimes said
to be an essential element of any crime, we think that in the
context of contempt it is at best a distracting concept and at
worst a misleading one.1 7 However, the report did not com-
pletely abandon the concept of "intent" as an element of con-
tempt. Rather, the study looked to the Seale case for a resolu-
70 Note, 25 ME. L. REV. 89, supra note 14, at 94.
7, Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, supra note 12, at 465.
72 Id.
11 Dobbs, supra note 8, at 265. This statement from Dobbs is quoted by the court
in the Seale case, 461 F.2d 345, 368 n.44.
74 Id.
7 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 108-09.
" Id. at 109.
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tion of the conflicting views as to the meaning of "intent" and
its place in the context of attorney contempts.
In Seale the Seventh Circuit set forth the basic elements
of contempt under federal law77 and held that "intent to ob-
struct" was a required element of a contemptuous offense. In
reaching this conclusion the judges initially stated:
[This requirement has received a variety of treatment by
different courts. For example, while numerous courts, includ-
ing this Court, have apparently required a specific finding of
wrongful intent. . . a standard urged by appellant Seale, the
Government has vigorously argued that the lesser require-
ment enunciated in Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69
(D.C. Cir.), certiorari denied, 351 U.S. 988 ...(1956), be
applied. In Of:utt, the Court established a two-part test for
the intent requirement."
Apparently, the Offutt test was based upon the nature of the
contempt. If the conduct was "clearly blameworthy," intent
need not be shown but if it was not so clear, then there would
be no contempt absent a showing of "some sort of wrongful
intent."79 Based upon its analysis, the Seale court reached the
conclusion "that the better position is strictly to require a find-
ing of intent in every case,"8 with proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of this intent to be an essential part of the contempt
case.
The court, however, did not stop there, for it realized that
the problem was more complex. Recognizing that requiring a
showing of "intent" in order to punish for contempt without
defining in some form what was meant by that term would be
of little value, the court pointed to the extreme disparity in
judicial treatment of the topic. One view holds that "all that
is required is a willful or volitional act without regard to the
known or intended consequences of the act."81 The opposing
position, expounded by Seale in this case, is that a showing of
actual or "culpable" intent to obstruct justice is required to
- 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1971).
7A 461 F.2d 345, 367 (7th Cir. 1972).
7' Id.
Id. at 367-68.
" Id. at 368.
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punish for contempt."2 The court's response to these divergent
claims was: "To us, neither formulation offers a viable stan-
dard. The minimum requisite intent is better defined as a voli-
tional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be
aware that his conduct is wrongful."' ' The court thus sought to
establish some objective criteria, based upon volition and
reasonable knowledge, for resolving the issue of intent. It re-
jected the view that intent must be presumed or that one must
intend the "natural consequences" of his acts. The court took
the position that intent in some form was an essential feature
of a contumacious offense and that absent a showing of the
requisite intent, a contempt conviction could not be sustained.
The Seventh Circuit carried its formulation of the intent
factor over into the area of attorney misconduct. In the
Dellinger decision the court stated: "[A]n attorney possesses
the requisite intent only if he knows or reasonably should be
aware in view of all the circumstances, especially the heat of
controversy, that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his
proper role and hindering rather than facilitating the search for
truth.",4
Disorder in the Court praised the stance taken by the Seale
court, yet the report also asserted that what the court had
called intent was not really intent. 5 When dealing with attor-
neys involved in the conflict of a trial, it would seem particu-
larly appropriate to emphasize, as the courts did in Seale and
Dellinger, that the lawyer's conduct must be intentional and
willful in order to be found contemptuous. Otherwise, zealous
and forceful arguments by the advocate would be threatened.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972). The Sixth Circuit decision in United States
v. Delahanty, 488 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1973), also emphasized the need for intentional
attorney misconduct in order to justify a contempt citation. The court stated that an
"essential element of [criminal] contempt is an intent either specific or general, to
commit it." The view was expressed that "[bly definition, contempt is a willful
disregard or disobedience of a public authority." By way of concluding the court
stated: "The requisite intent may of course be inferred if a lawyer's conduct discloses
a reckless disregard for his professional duty. In the appellant's case, however, there
was no evidence that he deliberately or recklessly disregarded his obligation to the
court, or that he intended any disrespect for the court." Id. at 398.
95 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 110.
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To reject a consideration of intent because of potential difficul-
ties in resolving the issue is clearly wrong. The Seale-Dellinger
standards, while not the only ones available, have value. They
acknowledge that some form of intent is required for an attor-
ney's conduct to be contumacious. Secondly, these standards
emphasize that in order to find the requisite intent on the part
of the trial lawyer, a court must conclude that at the time of
the violative conduct, the attorney knew or should reasonably
have known his conduct was obstructive. In assuming this
stance, the court recognized that an advocate's conduct, al-
though obstructive, may not be contemptuous if he acted with-
out reasonable knowledge that such conduct was indeed ob-
structive. At least theoretically, such standards may protect
the overly zealous attorney from possible arbitrary punish-
ment, while permitting conduct which is clearly wrongful to be
effectively sanctioned.
C. Good Faith
Bearing on both "obstruction" and "intent," the element
of "good faith" should be considered in determining whether
an attorney's conduct is contemptuous." In this context, a
finding of good faith serves as a limiting or mitigating factor.
A court which recognizes the difficult position of the trial law-
yer, attempting to provide his client with the best possible
defense, should consider the circumstances surrounding the
offensive actions and whether the attorney acted in good faith
in so conducting himself.87 Of course this does not mean that a
good faith motivation should excuse all actions on the part of
counsel. What it does mean, however, is that in assessing
whether the attorney's actions were in fact contemptuous and,
if so, the kind and degree of sanction called for, the judge
should take into consideration the attorney's attitude and any
"good faith" motivations of his conduct.
A court, deciding if a trial attorney's conduct is contemp-
tuous, should consider the various factors set out above, paying
" Id. at 110-11.
' Note, 25 ME. L. REV. 89, supra note 14, at 94; Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, supra
note 14, at 335. For a case dealing with the "good faith" issue see State v. Pokini, 521
P.2d 668 (Hawaii 1974).
19751
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
particular attention to whether an obstruction of the judicial
process results from the conduct and whether the requisite in-
tent is present. Likewise the attorney's good faith should be
considered in mitigation of the offense. Unfortunately, courts
often neglect these elements and simply hold the attorney in
contempt with little regard for such "formalities." There may
be many reasons for this; but it would seem that one prominent
reason is that, in its haste to vindicate its own authority and
punish what is considered a crime against the court itself, a
court may often neglect technicalities or procedural rules.
Clearly, this is not proper. Still, however, it is obvious that a
court must have effective devices by which to control the
proceedings so that it can maintain at least the minimum deco-
rum necessary for proper judicial administration. To strike an
even balance here, particularly in our adversary, adjudicatory
system, can often be difficult.
D. The Kentucky Court's Assessment of Taylor's Conduct
In the Taylor case there were nine alleged instances of
criminally contemptuous conduct, consisting of disrespectful
"tone of voice" or gestures, disobedience of the judge's orders,
and continued argument on a particular point already ruled
upon by the court. 88 On appeal, Taylor asserted that none of
88 The nine criminal contempts of Taylor, as certified in the corrected judgment
by Judge Hayes were as follows:
Contempt 1. Mr. Taylor, in questioning a prospective juror, on the second
day of Voir Dire, repeatedly ignored the Court's order not to iontinue a
certain line of questioning and to ask his questions to the jury as a whole.
He evidenced utter disrespect fdr prospective jurors.
Contempt 2. The Court sustained the Commonwealth objection on the use
of a prior statement to cross examine Officer Hogan and not to go into the
escape of Narvel Tinsley. Mr. Taylor repeatedly and completely ignored the
Court's ruling.
Contempt 3. During the playing of a tape recording of the voice of witness
David White, Mr. Taylor wrote on a blackboard. After the playing of the tape
it was ordered that the blackboard be removed from the Court and Mr.
Taylor was advised by the Court that he could use it in his final summation
to the jury. Mr. Taylor was disrespectful to the Court by his tone of voice
and manner when he replied, "I'll keep that in mind your honor."
Contempt 4. During cross examination of Narvel Tinsley by Mr. Schroering,
Mr. Taylor interrupted and moved for a recess, was overruled by the Court
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his cited actions amounted to contempt because none were
obstructive in result or done with the requisite intent. They
were at most, he argued, disrespectful to the court.89 Concern-
and refused to take his seat at counsel's table as ordered.
Contempt 5. Complete and utter disrespect by Mr. Taylor in the questioning
of Mr. Irvin Foley, as attorney and Legal Advisor to the Louisville Police
Department. . . . Mr. Taylor accused the Court of disallowing admittance
of black persons in the Courtroom. . . and made a statement in the presence
of the jury inferring that only white police officers could enter the courtroom
Contempt 6. The witness, Jesse Taylor, a Lousiville Police Officer, read a
statement by witness, David White. A Ruling was made by the Court that
the statement spoke for itself, had been introduced in evidence and could
not be commented on by Officer Taylor, who merely took the statement. Mr.
Taylor continued to disregard the Court's order and ruling by continually
reading parts of the statement out of context.
Contempt 7. Mr. Taylor in examining Mr. Norbert Brown, again referred to
a press conference that the Court had previously ordered him not to go into.
He also waved his arms at the witness in a derogatory manner indicating the
witness was not truthful and showing utter contempt of the Court's ruling.
Contempt 8. The Court directed Mr. Taylor to call his witness. He called Lt.
Garrett, Louisville Police Department. After this witness was sworn and took
the stand, a deputy sheriff advised the Court that Mr. Taylor's aide was not
searched, as everyone else had been upon entering the Courtroom. Mr. Tay-
lor ordered the deputy to search his aide. The Court ordered Mr. Taylor to
begin his examination, which he refused to do until he was cited for contempt
in Court's chamber.
Contempt 9. Mr. Taylor repeatedly asked the same question of witness Floyd
Miller that the Court had held improper. He was also disrespectful in his
tone of voice when referring to a certain police officer as "this nice police
officer."
494 S.W.2d 737, 739-40 (Ky. 1973).
The California Supreme Court has also dealt with the issue of disrespect in tone
of voice as a basis for contempt. In In re Hallinan, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969),
the court held that where the words spoken by the attorney were not themselves
insulting, a mere recital, in conclusionary terms that the attorney's tone was disres-
pectful was not enough to sustain a contempt conviction. The court felt that in defend-
ing a client, an attorney must be given broad freedom of expression and that in the
heat of courtroom debate the lawyer must be permitted to be persistent. In Gallagher
v. Municipal Court, 192 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1948), Justice Traynor followed the same sort
of reasoning. Where an attorney's language was not in itself disrespectful, conclusions
by the judge that it was loud, insolent and so on, were, in Traynor's opinion, not
enough to uphold a criminal contempt conviction. It is equally clear, however, that an
open refusal by an attorney to obey a court's order, even if the order is wrong, is
contemptuous. See Seale v. United States, 461 F.2d at 371.
" Brief for Appellant at 27-36, Taylor v. Hayes, 494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
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ing such disrespect, Taylor stated: "[M]aking disrespectful
remarks to the Court, about the Court or in reference to wit-
nesses simply does not constitute criminal contempt where the
making of such a remark does not involve an actual and mate-
rial obstruction to the administration of justice.""0
Judge Hayes contended that the record fully sustained
each finding of contempt and could in fact have supported
more." Accepting Taylor's definition of contempt as "an actual
obstruction of the administration of justice with some form of
intent to obstruct with full appreciation of the contentious role
of trial counsel and his duty of zealous representation,"92 Judge
Hayes concluded that Taylor's conduct was indeed contemp-
tuous.,3
The Kentucky Court of Appeals completely rejected Tay-
lor's arguments. The Court's opinion made no mention of the
factors of obstruction, intent or good faith,94 but instead stated:
"Daniel Taylor was guilty of each and every contempt as
charged by the court, and if the court had so desired there
could have been numerous other charges assessed in the course
of the trial.""9 The Court of Appeals made it abundantly clear
that in its opinion, Taylor's conduct was unquestionably con-
temptuous. As sources of these contempts, the Court pointed
not only to his disrespectful conduct, but also to his "innumer-
able objections, statements, and requests for conferences in
chambers,"9 and to the fact that he "continuously disregarded
the court's orders and directions."97 Commissioner Catirma, in
Id. at 35.
" Brief for Appellee at 24-31,.Taylor v. Hayes, 494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
,1 Id. at 24. The judge's brief expresses the view that intent can be determined by
relying upon the concept that one intends the natural consequences of his actions. "If
a trial judge tells a lawyer not to do something and he does it anyway, we can only
assume he intended to do it and obstruction of justice is apparent." Id. at 26.
"Id. at 24-31.
" While the Court cited the Seale case on the point of obstruction, it did not in
fact discuss this factor in any detail. The Court did conclude that Taylor's actions were
deliberate and disruptive but again failed to discuss the meanings of such terms or how
it reached this conclusion.
" 494 S.W.2d at 741.
" Id. at 740.
'7 Id. at 740-41.
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emphasizing Taylor's disrespect, indicated that even Taylor's
appellate brief "demonstrates something less than complete
and total respect for the judicial system of this Common-
wealth.""
The ruling of the Kentucky Court largely followed the line
of reasoning, developed in its earlier decisions, that disrespect-
ful conduct by an attorney amounts to a contempt of court.
Generally, it appears that Kentucky courts have not considered
intent or good faith in determining whether an attorney's con-
duct before a court is contemptuous. Further, the Kentucky
view appears to be that obstruction can be presumed from
disrespect." Although in some cases, such as Lewis v. Rice,'
the Court has indicated that a lawyer could not be held in
contempt for "charging in good faith merely that the judge is
biased or prejudiced" in a written motion to vacate the
bench,"' Kentucky courts have generally emphasized the duty
of respect owed by an attorney to the court, a duty which may
not be breached in defense of a client. In Huggins v. Field,02
the Court forcefully announced:
Attorneys are officers of the court, and as such are called
upon to uphold the dignity of the court and to respect its
authority, and they have no right, under the guise of protect-
ing the interest of their clients, to depart from the well-
established rules of practice in order to unnecessarily insult,
scandalize, and otherwise impugn the honor and integrity of
the court. They should confine their utterances to such as the
law allows, and in exercising their rights on behalf of their
clients they should do so in a respectful manner, and employ
only respectful and decorous language." 3
In the context of such prior decisions, it is not unusual that
the Court of Appeals in Taylor v. Hayes emphasized "respect,"
"Id. at 741.
" See cases cited in note 7 supra.
IN 261 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1953).
'' Id. at 805.
' 244 S.W. 903 (Ky. 1922).
" Id. at 905. For cases following Huggins, see Casteel v. Sparks, 226 S.W.2d 533
(Ky. 1950); Marshall v. Hancock, 188 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1945). See also Miller v. Ste-
phenson, 474 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1971); In re Woolley, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 95 (1875). See
text accompanying notes 18-23 supra for a discussion of the lawyer's status as an
"officer of the court."
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while largely ignoring the questions of actual obstruction, in-
tent and good faith. The Court apparently adopted the view,
largely rejected in the Seale case, that "clearly blameworthy"
conduct is per se contemptuous, and evidenced no real concern
for the substantive factors constituting a contumacious offense.
While these factors should form the nucleus of a determination
of contempt, the Kentucky Court, like many others, did not
really deal with them. Although conduct such as Taylor's may
well be contemptuous, to disregard the basic factors outlined
above in judging counsel's conduct places a heavy burden on
the trial lawyer who must be "respectful" to the court and at
the same instant may be "persistent, vociferous, contentious
and imposing even to the point of appearing obnoxious," ' 4 in
advocating his client's rights.
The Taylor decision points strikingly to the need for courts
to more carefully consider an attorney's conduct under trial
circumstances, even where the attorney's guilt may seem to be
"obvious," before sustaining a conviction for criminal con-
tempt based upon "disrespect" or zealous and lengthy argu-
mentation. By employing the factors outlined above, a court
can more readily distinguish between that conduct of trial
counsel that is truly contumacious, and that which, though
offensive to the court's sensibilities, is yet nonobstructive and
simply the result of a hard fought adversary adjudication.
Again, it should be noted that the concern here is not with the
actual guilt or innocence of Taylor, or any other trial attorney.
What is significant is that because of the nature of this offense,
a court should give full and serious consideration to the essen-
tial elements of a contemptuous offense and not simply pre-
sume guilt from the nature of the charge."5
"I In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
105 Taylor attempted to have the Supreme Court assess his substantive guilt.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28-31, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Petition]. See also Brief for Association of Trail Lawyers of
America as Amicus Curiae at 3-6, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). However, the
Supreme Court was unwilling to delve into this area of state substantive law. Never-




IV. THE ATTORNEY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Closely joined to the problem of what type of conduct con-
stitutes contempt is the issue of the procedure by which the
attorney's guilt or innocence is adjudged. In the summary pro-
cedure for contempt, two particular points in time are impor-
tant. A trial judge, under accepted law, may cite and convict
for contempt immediately upon its occurrence in his presence,
during trial. Alternatively, and more usually with attorneys,
the judge may delay his action in response to contemptuous
conduct until the close of the trial, at which time he cites and
convicts the attorney of contempt for conduct occurring pre-
viously in his presence during trial.' 0 In both of these situations
the issues arise as to whether the judge must grant the accused
contemnor notice and an opportunity to be heard before impos-
ing punishment, and whether the judge who cites for contempt
may also determine guilt or innocence and impose punishment.
A. Due Process Rights: The Conflicting Positions
Several reasons can be advanced in support of affording
the accused contemnor notice and some form of hearing as part
of the contempt procedure. ' An initial reason is that the fac-
tual issues of obstruction, intent and good faith, as well as the
issue of whether contempt is the proper sanction to employ,
must be adequately resolved. It seems obvious that some form
of notice and hearing are necessary to a proper determination
of these issues-a hearing allowing an attorney to explain or
apologize for his conduct, and notice allowing him to ade-
quately prepare his defense.108 A second reason indicating the
,01 See note 10 supra.
10, The position in support of a hearing to deal with a lawyer's allegedly contemp-
tuous performance is set forth in Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, supra note 14, at 353:
To ensure vigorous and effective advocacy and the independence of the bar,
the power to summarily punish an attorney for contempt ought properly
accede to traditional due process procedure. The trial judge would retain the
substantive power to indict for contempt, but the procedural power would
then be defined according to the constitutional requirements of notice, hear-
ing, and an opportunity to defend. This procedure is essential for both the
determination of guilt and the assurance of meaningful appellate review.
,' See Note, 25 ME. L. REv. 89, supra note 14, at 100-01; Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REv.
463, supra note 12, at 465.
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need for notice and a hearing in contempt cases is the general
inadequacy of appellate review in such cases."0 9 The summary
procedure makes no provision for the accused attorney to de-
fend himself, thus compelling the appellate court to rely solely
on the trial record and the judge's own descriptions of the con-
duct in assessing the propriety of the trial court's sanction.
Absent a hearing, the issues of obstruction, intent and good
faith can only be inferentially examined by way of the "facts"
present in the record. Furthermore, because trial courts have
often found contempt in such items as tone of voice, stance,
facial expression and so on, a record containing no more than
the trial judge's own description of the conduct places the ap-
pellate court in no position to adequately review such contempt
convictions. Based upon such a record the appellate court must
either totally defer to the trial judge's opinion or simply reject
it.110
Third, due process of law requires both notice and a hear-
ing in such cases. To deny these basic procedural safeguards is
to deny fundamental concepts of our constitutional system."'
Clearly, the imposition of serious criminal penalties for con-
tempt, without affording the accused notice or a hearing, can-
' Until recently, Kentucky law denied appellate review in criminal contempt
cases. See KRS § 21.060(1)(c): "Appeals may be taken to the Court of Appeals as a
matter of right from all final orders and judgments of circuit courts in civil cases
except: (c) judgments punishing contempts." This statutory limitation on appellate
review has been considered by the Kentucky Court in several cases. See Levisa Stone
Corp. v. Hays, 429 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1968); Craft v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150
(Ky. 1961); Adams v. Gardner, 195 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1917); Gordon v. Commonwealth,
133 S.W. 206 (Ky. 1911); French v. Commonwealth, 97 S.W. 427 (Ky. 1906). From
these cases the following qualifications to the statutory limit upon appellate review
emerged: (1) the statutory provision did not prohibit an appeal on the issue of the
legality or excessiveness of the punishment imposed; (2) although the Court of Appeals
could correct illegal or excessive penalties, it could not review the substantive issue of
contempt; and (3) this statute was applicable only to criminal contempts. Review of
contempt convictions was afforded despite this statutory provision by way of the writ
of prohibition.
In Miller v. Vettiner, 481 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1972), the Court of Appeals held that
the limitations on appeal of contempt convictions imposed by KRS § 21.060(1)(c) did
not apply to those contempts for which punishment was not limited by statute. Thus,
the present law of Kentucky permits an appeal of a criminal contempt conviction.
"I Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, supra note 12, at 466. See also note 89 supra &
note 121 infra.
"I See notes 12-14 supra.
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not be squared with well-established due process concepts.
Furthermore, to conform with the rudimentary principles
of due process and fairness, any such hearing should be before
a judge other than the one who has brought the contempt
charge. A basic tenet of our judicial philosophy is that the
court, in deciding a case before it, must be impartial. "The
principle that no man should be a judge in his own cause is a
principle early accepted in American law."12 Although the re-
quirement of judicial impartiality does not demand judicial
indifference," 3 when the issue to be dealt with focuses on con-
duct allegedly contemptuous of the court and trial judge, a real
question arises as to that judge's ability to decide the case
without bias. As a result, summary adjudication of criminal
contempt by the offended judge represents an apparent devia-
tion from the principles of impartiality and due process of law.
In his dissenting opinion in Green v. United States,"4 Jus-
tice Black observed that in a contempt case:
[w]hen the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge,
jury and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge he is ob-
viously incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly fair
and true and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence
of the accused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause.
The defendant charged with criminal contempt is thus de-
nied what I have always thought to be an indispensible ele-
ment of due process of law-an objective, scrupulously im-
partial tribunal to determine whether he is guilty or innocent
of the charges filed against him."'
12 Kutner, supra note 14, at 70. The Supreme Court established this fundamental
rule in the case of In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955):
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness
of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge of his own cause and no man
is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome .... Such
a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias
and who would do their very best to weight the scales of justice equally
between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way
"justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
M W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 945-46 (6th ed. 1974).
' 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
" Id. at 199 (Black, J., dissenting). For another opinion by Justice Black which
presents an interesting contrast to his dissent in Green, see FTC v. Cement Institute,
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In Disorder in the Court, the Special Committee on Courtroom
Disorder also questioned whether the offended judge should
rule on the matter. "Due process of law," the report stated,
"requires an impartial judge in all criminal cases. This prob-
lem is particularly acute in contempt cases, where the actions
or words of an individual accused of contempt often antagonize
the sitting judge, raising questions about his suitability to act
on the charge."'1 6
The argument against summary adjudication by the ac-
cusing judge is that although criminal contempt is an offense
against the court, often an attorney's conduct is considered an
affront to the trial judge himself. As a result, while "[i]deally
the power given to a judge must be separate from his emo-
tions.... .judges are human and may in the heat of the
moment confuse personal affront with judicial disruption."" 7
To insure the impartiality necessary to due process, another
judge, uninvolved with the incident or issues, should consider
the contempt charges in a separate hearing after proper no-
tice.'
The case for denying notice and a hearing before an impar-
tial judge draws its strength from the basic rationale for sum-
mary contempt proceedings. One reason given for denying a
hearing before another judge is that since the offense has oc-
curred in the very presence of the judge, there is no need for a
separate hearing. Having witnessed the contempt, this judge
333 U.S. 683 (1948).
"I DISORDER, supra note 14, at 224. See also Dobbs, supra note 8, at 283; Hermann,
supra note 14, at 601; Kutner, supra note 14, at 68-73; Note, 25 ME. L. REv. 89, supra
note 14, at 102; Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, supra note 12, at 469; & Note, 1971 Wis.
L. REv. 329 supra note 14, at 353, for other authorities convinced that the accusing
judge should not also decide guilt in the case of criminal contempt.
In Sacher, the majority indicated that any direct contempt would be regarded by
the trial judge as an offense against him personally. 343 U.S. at 12. See the dissents of
Mr. Justice Black, 343 U.S. at 14-15, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 343 U.S. at 33-35,
in Sacher for additional argument against permitting the offended judge to adjudicate
a contempt case.
,, Note, 25 ME. L. REv. 89, supra note 14, at 94-95.
"' The general concept of judicial impartiality has been the basis of a number of
Supreme Court decisions in noncontempt cases. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See also American Cyanamid
v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
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can himself assess guilt or innocence without a hearing; and,
to require a hearing before a different judge, it is argued, would
be no more than a waste of time and judicial resources. '19 Sec-
ondly, those disputing the right to a hearing consider appellate
review wholly adequate to remedy any deficiencies in the trial
judge's rulings and to insure that the punishment imposed is
both legal and not excessive.'20
A third argument advanced against requiring a separate
hearing, in cases of direct contempt, is that the trial judge must
have this summary power in order to maintain the order and
integrity of his courtroom. To demand that there be notice and
a hearing before a different tribunal on issues surrounding the
alleged contempt would, the argument goes, deprive the trial
judge of a tool essential to the preservation of order and pro-
priety in the courtroom. 12' Lastly, it is argued by some that to
require a separate hearing before a judge other than the one
citing for contempt, at which that trial judge might have to
appear as a witness, would adversely affect respect for the judi-
ciary.122
These justifications for the summary contempt procedure
have been subjected to intense criticism. The critics suggest
that the conclusions that the accusing judge is best able to
determine contempt and that a separate hearing would be a
waste of time and expense, because the accusing judge is an
"I Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, supra note 12, at 464-65:
If the alleged contempt occurs in the presence of the court, is there any need
for a hearing? The judge, assuming his objectivity, sees the act with all its
nuances. It may be argued that he is in a good position to know whether the
behavior is, as a matter of law, contemptuous and whether, as a matter of
law, there can be any justification for the behavior.
See also Lane, supra note 13, at 384; American Trial Lawyers Report, supra note 13,
at 35-36.
'" Lane, supra note 13, at 392. "[S]trict appellate supervision of contempt con-
victions affords the best opportunity for minimizing the possibility of arbitrary action,
particularly in those situations where the offended court has proceeded summarily
without granting the contemnor a hearing." Id. Still, however, Lane is forced to ac-
knowledge the limitations on appellate review. See also American Trial Lawyers Re-
port, supra note 13, at 36.
"I American Trial Lawyers Report, supra note 13, at 35-36. The argument is that
the threat of a later trial does not provide the trial judge with an effective deterrent to
courtroom misconduct.
I" Lane, supra note 13, at 385.
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"eyewitness" to the offense, are belied by several factors. First,
the rationale that the "eyewitness" status of the accusing judge
somehow vitiates the need for a fair hearing before an impartial
judge is clearly flawed. To begin with, eyewitness testimony is
never in itself conclusive of guilt in a criminal case. While it
may be strong evidence of guilt, it alone is not dispositive of
the issue. Why then should it be treated as dispositive in cases
of criminal contempt?12
In addition, it is highly questionable that time and eco-
nomics are sufficient justifications for denying the right to an
impartial adjudication of criminal contempt charges. Savings
of time and money can never serve as an adequate justification
for the suspension of basic constitutional rights. As Justice
Black pointed out in Green v. United States, while the sum-
mary contempt procedure may save time and funds:
[S]uch trifling economics as may result have not generally
been thought sufficient for abandoning our great constitu-
tional safeguards aimed at protecting freedom and other
basic human rights of incalculable value. Cheap, easy convic-
.tions were not the primary concern of those who adopted the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Every procedural safe-
guard they established purposely made it more difficult for
the Government to convict those it accused of crimes. On
their scale of values justice occupied at least as high a posi-
tion as economy. 24
Moreover, courts themselves have acknowledged that ap-
pellate review is, in reality, inadequate to remedy the deficien-
cies of the summary contempt process.1 25 Finally, upon exami-
"2 Note, 25 ME. L. REv. 89, supra note 14, at 100.
121 356 U.S. 185, 216 (1958) (Black J., dissenting). See also Taylor v. Hayes, 418
U.S. 488, 500 (1974). A number of recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the
time and expense involved in giving notice and a hearing are not sufficient to do away
with such fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969). See also Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971). These cases indicate a strong tendency in
the federal courts to hold to the position that time and expense alone are not sufficient
to avoid notice and a hearing when important rights are involved.
1' Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199-200 (1958). See also Fisher v. Pace,
336 U.S. 155 (1949) (where the Court indicates that its ability to review the trial judge's
actions are limited by the record before it); DISORDER, supra note 14, at 236.
[Vol. 63
SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER
nation, the remaining arguments in support of summary con-
tempt procedures, those that say requiring notice and a hearing
would irreparably injure the functioning of an orderly court and
that requiring a judge to appear as a witness in a later hearing
would harm the judicial system, appear to lack substance. The
need to preserve order is absent in post-verdict adjudications
of contempt and it is questionable that the summary power is
truly necessary to control the courtroom or the trial attorney.
"That the threat of immediate punishment is a more effectice
deterrent than the threat of punishment somewhat later [after
a separate hearing] is a highly speculative assertion."'," More-
over, to say that the orderly functioning of our judicial system
necessitates the retention of a power which not only goes
against the grain of our entire legal philosophy but also sus-
pends due process of law by denying notice and an opportunity
to be heard and by allowing the accuser to sit as judge in his
own cause, casts a dark shadow across that system. If requiring
conventional due process in direct criminal contempt cases
would greatly harm or destroy our legal structure, then that
structure is far more unstable than even its most ardent critics
would imagine. 2 ' The fact is that there is no just reason for not
following the dictates of due process in such cases.'1
,2 Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, supra note 12, at 468. It has been observed that:
[S]urely an attorney faced with an upcoming indictment and trial for con-
tempt will be constrained to be orderly in a trial context. Though the threat
of a later trial does not provide the immediate deterrent effect of summary
disposal, there is another constitutionally permissible sanction which could
give added force to the contempt citation. Lawyers might well be deterred
from contemptuous actions if the state adopts a lawyer disciplinary agency
to review contempt convictions and possibly mete out added punishment.
Note, 25 ME. L. REv. 89, supra note 14, at 90. See also DISORDER, supra note 14, at
235.
In Note, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, supra note 14, at 354, where the author remarks:
"[I]f the American legal system is so fragile that abandonment of the summary
contempt power would plunge it into chaos, that fact in itself is testimony to the
existence of a fundamental deficiency in the system." In DISORDER, supra note 14, at
232, it is stated that the summary contempt power "performs no essential role in
controlling misbehavior." However, Lane, supra note 13, at 389, still claims that re-
quiring a hearing before a separate judge would "dilute or possibly render completely
ineffective judicial control of courtroom proceedings."
In DISORDER, supra note 14, at 233-36. A fine summary of the argument in support
of a hearing to determine contempt is found in Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, supra
note 12, at 469:
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The adverse effects upon the judiciary allegedly caused by
requiring that the accusing judge appear as a witness at a later
hearing are mitigated by the fact that criminal contempt cita-
tions are rather infrequent." 9 Furthermore, it would seem that
by emphasizing impartiality and due process of law in dealing
with contempts, increased respect for the judiciary would be
engendered. 3 ' The authors of Disorder in the Court, in discuss-
ing the prospects of the trial judge being called as a witness,
concluded:
We understand the caution with which these courts have
approached the possibility of requiring a judge to testify
about a contempt that allegedly took place in his presence
and in which he may have been involved. But we do not think
that this presents a serious problem. In the exceptional case
where a trial judge's testimony would be important and there
is no adequate substitute available, there is no indignity or
loss of prestige to the bench in requiring the judge to testify
and be cross-examined. 3'
B. Due Process Rights in Summary Contempt Proceedings:
The Kentucky Cases
There are but a few Kentucky cases dealing with the issue
of due process rights in criminal contempt proceedings. One
early decision of some importance is In re Woolley,'32 which
dealt with an allegedly contemptuous petition for rehearing
It is concluded that the summary method of dealing with contempts is unfair
in not permitting the accused to prepare and present evidence, and in per-
mitting the offended judge to decide the issue. Further, neither of these
deficiencies is cured by the scope of appellate review currently available. The
alternative procedure of a hearing before another judge would not signifi-
cantly handicap the judiciary in the performance of its function. Because
there is a reasonable alternative which provides persons accused of direct
contempt with procedural rights generally considered necessary, the sum-
mary imposition of punishment should be held violative of due process. All
direct contempts should be proceeded against by means of notice and a
hearing before an independent tribunal.
'2' DISORDER, supra note 14, at 6-8, 131.
,30 Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 299 (1971). For the
opposing arguments see Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, supra note 12, at 469; Lane, supra
note 13, at 385-86.
"I DISORDER, supra note 14, at 231-32.
132 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 95 (1874).
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filed with the Kentucky Court of Appeals by attorney J.W.
Woolley. The petition contained "language not only disrespect-
ful, but insulting to the court. ' 133 Woolley filed a statement
attempting to explain his language, but only succeeded in fur-
ther irritating the Court. He was then directed to appear and
show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Although
he sought to avoid sanction by disavowing any intent to insult,
the Court of Appeals found him in contempt. The Court ruled
that since the offense was contained in a written motion to the
Court, the contempt was "in the presence of the court," just
as if the statements had been made orally to the judges. 134 The
Court then asserted its power to punish such a "direct" con-
tempt summarily. Regarding the need for notice and a hearing,
the Court said:
[W]hen the offense is committed in the presence of the court
notice to the offender is not usually essential ... in Ex parte
Secombe (19 How. U.S. Court Reports, 13) an attorney, for
acts committed in the presence of the court, was disbarred
without notice of the proceeding and without being heard,
and yet the Supreme Court held that the order disbarring
him was not void as it necessarily would have been if notice
had been essential under the circumstances .... 135
However, later in its opinion, the Court expressed mixed feel-
ings about this policy.
By the rule recognized by the Supreme Court in Secombe's
case respondent was not technically entitled to notice at all.
But regarding that rule as of doubtful propriety and not wish-
ing to be instrumental in introducing it into the practice of
the courts of this state, we caused him to be notified to ap-
pear, and offered him such opportunities to be heard as he
and his counsel desired.131
Thus, the Court of Appeals, in dealing with a
contemptuous written motion, held that it had the power to
punish the contempt without notice or a hearing, but declined
"I Id. at 102.
" Id. at 99-100.
" Id. at 99.
'" Id. at 100.
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to do so on the belief that such a procedure was of "doubtful
propriety." '37 The Court apparently felt that providing notice
and a hearing, which would allow the attorney to explain his
words and disclaim any contemptuous intent, was the better
procedure.
Certain later decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
seem to follow the reasoning of the Woolley case. These deci-
sions, at least with regard to apparently contemptuous written
motions, emphasized the need for notice and a hearing as well
as the need for judicial impartiality. For example, in the case
of Marshall v. Hancock,"8 the Court indicated:
The necessity for the exercise of the power to punish for con-
tempt has been recognized, and the power has been enforced
from an early period, but where the contempt consists of
statements derogatory to the court, the power should be exer-
cised with caution and discretion. Where the contempt con-
sists of statements susceptible to the construction that they
were intended to reflect on the integrity of the judge, oppor-
tunity should be afforded to the offender to purge himself of
the contempt by explanation, apology, or retraction. The
court, however, acts in its discretion in the matter."'
In this opinion, a stance similar to that in the Woolley case
was taken-a hearing is advisable and is the better procedure,
but the trial court has the power to proceed without notice or
a hearing. Furthermore, citing the Supreme Court case of
Cooke v. United States,4 ' the Marshall opinion emphasized the
need to avoid arbitrary or oppressive rulings in the exercise of
the contempt power. The Court of Appeals indicated that in
utilizing his contempt powers the trial judge should avoid any
impulse to personal reprisal in order to afford the alleged con-
temnor a fair adjudication."' Again, it should be noted that
these cases dealt with written motions of a supposedly contu-
macious nature.
A recent Kentucky case dealing with the notice and hear-
137 Id.
188 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1945).
,3' Id. at 479. See also Lewis v. Rice, 261 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky. 1953).
10 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
"1 188 S.W.2d at 480.
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ing issue is Miller v. Vettiner.12 This case concerned the failure
of a witness to obey a subpoena, rather than the conduct of an
attorney toward the court. Nevertheless, the Court undertook
to present a summary of Kentucky law on the need for a hear-
ing in contempt cases:
[WIhat we are holding is that when the existence or non-
existence of a contempt, civil or criminal, requires the resolu-
tion of a factual issue, the trial court may itself resolve that
issue upon the basis of a hearing in which the alleged offender
is afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense, but may
not in such a case inflict a fine greater than $500 and incar-
ceration for more than six months except upon the unani-
mous verdict of a jury finding the offender guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We do not deal with cases in which the
contempt is committed in the immediate presence of the
court or in which the factual basis for the finding of contempt
is otherwise conclusively established, except to point out that
in such cases it is imperative, incident to the right of appeal,
that the facts be shown by a proper record.
143
This summary clearly indicates: (1) that the trial judge
has power to summarily punish contempts committed in his
presence; (2) that if there is a factual dispute in a contempt
case, either civil or criminal, a hearing is required, at which the
alleged contemnor has the right to speak in his own behalf; (3)
that in cases of direct contempt the presumption is that guilt
of contempt is conclusively established by the trial judge and
no hearing is required; (4) that even in such a case, without a
hearing, an adequate record must be presented for appellate
review; and, (5) that the imposition of a fine in excess of $500
and/or imprisonment for more than six months requires a jury
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. This opinion seems to
establish a right to a hearing in cases, such as Woolley and
Marshall, where there might be a factual issue in dispute; but
it clearly holds that there is no hearing required in the case of
a direct contempt. Despite its comments in earlier cases, the
Court in Miller was apparently willing to establish the rule in
Kentucky that direct contempts do not require notice and a
42 481 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1972).
"3 Id. at 35.
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hearing. Miller also sanctions adjudication by the offended
judge, a result not inconsistent with cases such as Marshall and
Lewis v. Rice,'44 which reveal a concern for judicial impartiality
in contempt cases, but which do not prevent the offended judge
from ruling in the case. Thus, the decisions of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, while acknowledging the infirmities of the
summary contempt process, have except in certain limited sit-
uations, served to sanction the process.
C. Due Process Rights and Summary Contempt: The Federal
Decisions
A case frequently cited for the view that a hearing is not
required in cases of direct contempt is Ex Parte Terry,' de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1888. This case involved a wild
occurrence in a federal court in California. A Miss Sarah Hill
alleged that Senator William Sharon was her husband and
sought a divorce and property settlement from him. Eventu-
ally, she succeeded and was awarded a substantial recovery.
After Sharon's death his estate sued in federal court to set aside
the earlier verdict in favor of Miss Hill, who had in the mean-
time married California Judge David S. Terry. The estate pre-
vailed, but when the time came for the federal judge to read
his opinion, the Terrys broke into a slug-fest with the marshal,
during which Judge Terry attempted to pull a knife while his
wife cursed the court and struggled with the marshals. After
being held in contempt of court, Terry took his case to the
Supreme Court. The Court discussed the hearing issue at
length and concluded that authority established the power of
a trial court to punish a direct contempt immediately, without
notice, a hearing or any other proceedings. 4 Based on this
1 261 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1953).
1 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
"I6 Id. at 309-10. In reaching this conclusion the Court in Terry stated:
It is true, as counsel suggest, that the power which the court has of instantly
punishing, without further proof or examination, contempts committed in its
presence, is one that may be abused and may sometimes be exercised hastily
or arbitrarily. But that is not an argument to disprove either its existence or
the necessity of its being lodged in the courts. That power cannot be denied
them without inviting or causing such obstruction to the orderly and impar-
tial administration of justice as would endanger the rights and safety of the
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power and the premise that instantaneous action was necessary
to preserve courtroom order, the Court in Terry upheld the use
of contempt without notice or a hearing.
In a later case, Cooke v. United States,147 the Supreme
Court again had occasion to deal with the issue of whether the
accused contemnor must be afforded notice and a hearing. The
Court discussed the Terry decision and its conclusion that, in
the case of a direct contempt, notice and a hearing were not
necessary, because the judge had witnessed the offense and
such a power was essential to preserve order. The situation in
Cooke, however, was distinguishable from Terry, in that
Cooke's alleged contempt arose from a letter he had sent to the
trial judge. Finding that the need to preserve order was not
present, in such a case, and that the offense was not in the
court's presence, Chief Justice Taft concluded that Cooke was
entitled to notice and a hearing. The Court stated:
Due process of law in the prosecution of contempt, except of
that committed in open court, requires that the accused
should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable op-
portunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We
think this includes the assistance of counsel if requested, and
the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either
to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the
offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed."8
The Cooke decision recognized the power of the trial judge
to punish a contempt committed in his presence immediately,
entire community....
... It results from what has been said that it was competent for the
Circuit Court, immediately upon the commission in its presence, of the
contempt recited in the order of September 3, to proceed upon its own knowl-
edge of the facts, and punish the offender, without further proof, and without
issue on trial in any form. It was not bound to hear any explanation of his
motives, if it was satisfied, and we must conclusively presume, from the
record before us, that it was satisfied, from what occurred under its own eye
and within its hearing, that the ends of justice demanded immediate action,
and that no explanation could mitigate his offense or disprove the fact that
he had committed such contempt of its authority and dignity as deserved
instant punishment.
Id.
, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
"' Id. at 537.
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with neither notice nor hearing. But the Court ruled that con-
tempts committed outside the court's view, in which factual'
issues might arise, require both notice and a hearing. Still un-
resolved, however, was the issue of the use of the summary
proceedings, without notice or hearing, at the close of the trial
to punish for contemptuous conduct occurring before the court,
during the trial.
The Supreme Court approached this issue in the case of
Sacher v. United States,"' which dealt with contempt convic-
tions imposed on certain defense attorneys at the end of the
heated trial of several supposed communists. Speaking for the
majority, Mr. Justice Jackson concluded that, in such a case,
the trial judge could impose contempt convictions at the close
of trial without affording the attorneys notice or a hearing. The
majority clearly held that delaying punishment until the close
of trial did not extinguish the judge's power to proceed summa-
rily.150
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter questioned the validity
of the majority's conclusions, relying in part on the fact the
trial had continued until completion. "[W]hen the trial in fact
goes to completion, as here, without invoking summary convic-
tions, that in itself proves that there was no occasion for depar-
ture from the historic method of trying criminal charges, that
is, after notice and an opportunity for defense before a disinter-
ested judge."'' 1 Justice Frankfurter asserted that in a case such
as this, the need to preserve order by means of summary adju-
dication was absent, and that therefore, the rationale in sup-
port of summary proceedings failed. However, the majority
apparently held the opposite view.
1 5
1
I'D 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
Im Id. at 9-11. In Sacher, the Court was dealing with federal law, but the Court's
opinion broadly indicated that notice and a hearing were not necessary. The justifica-
tion set out by Justice Jackson for such a position included the need to preserve order,
the waste of time and money involved in a later hearing before another judge, and the
ability of appellate review to remedy any deficiencies in the trial judge's actions.
151 Id. at 39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Justice Black's dissent for his
argument in support of notice and a hearing in the case. Id. at 18.
,"I Certain cases after Sacher, including Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954) and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), have required that the
alleged contemnor be given a hearing before a judge other than the one who cited for
contempt. The rationale of these decisions was the citing trial judge's lack of impartial-
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Prior to the decision in Taylor, other cases were handed
down by the Supreme Court which intimated that the Sacher
decision was not the last word on the issue of whether notice
and a hearing should be made available to the accused contem-
nor. As a result, the argument that due process of law de-
manded notice and a hearing for the accused contemnor re-
mained very much alive.
153
Several recent federal appellate courts' decisions have also
dealt with the issues of notice and a hearing in contempt cases.
For example, in Weiss v. Burr,54 a case involving the contempt
conviction of a prosecuting attorney, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated:
The last and most difficult question is whether the trial
court's contempt procedures in respect to the three remaining
citations impinged Weiss's constitutional right to speak in
ity. Other decisions subsequent to Sacher were unclear on the notice-hearing issue.
Some, such as Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) and United States v. Barnett, 376
U.S. 681 (1963), seemed to support summary proceedings for contempt without notice
or a hearing, or at least for direct contempts. In Bloom the Court commented: "Due
process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in
open court, requires that the accused be advised of the charges and have a reasonable
opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation." 391 U.S. at 205, citing
Cooke v. United States, 207 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
I" In Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502 (1972), the Court noted: "[W]e have
stated time and time again that reasonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to
be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are 'basic in our system of jurisprud-
ence.'" Later in the same opinion, the Court said:
Where a court acts immediately to punish for contemptuous conduct
committed under its eye the contemnor is present, of course. There is then
no question of identity nor is a hearing in a formal sense necessary because
the judge has personally seen the offense and is acting on the basis of his own
observations. Moreover, in such a situation the contemnor has normally been
given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf in the nature of a right of
allocution.
Id. at 504. Other cases suggesting that the alleged contemnor should be afforded notice
and a hearing include Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) and In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948). In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) the
Court commented:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they
require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be pre-
ceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case.
Id. at 313. See also Dobbs, supra note 8, at 227.
I1 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973).
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defense and mitigation before being sentenced. . . We hold
that they did. Due process requires that contemnors, such as
Weiss, who are not cited and simultaneously punished for the
purpose of either restoring courtroom decorum or protecting
the safety of court officials are entitled to an opportunity for
allocution."'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that, in dealing with an attorney's
contemptuous conduct during the trial, if the trial judge delays
punishment until the close of the trial, due process requires
that the contemnor be given an opportunity to be heard in his
own behalf."'8
In a number of opinions the Supreme Court has considered
the need for an unbiased judge in criminal contempt cases. In
the Cooke case,'57 Chief Justice Taft emphasized the import-
ance of judicial impartiality in the exercise of the summary
contempt power. He remarked:
The power of contempt is a delicate one and care is needed
to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This rule of cau-
tion is more mandatory where the contempt charged has in
it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge.
The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to re-
prisal, but he should not bend backward and injure the au-
thority of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of
another judge would avoid either tendency but it is not al-
ways possible."'
'm Id. at 984. Note the court's observation that the Terry decision is outdated. Id.
at 986, n.24. See also United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1973).
,"I A final authority which might be considered in support of affording the accused
contemnor notice and some occasion to defend himself is the ABA PROJECT ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN DEALING WITH
TRIAL DISRUPTIONS, Part F(4), where it is stated:
Before imposing any punishment for criminal contempt, the judge should
give the offender notice of the charges and at least a summary opportunity
to adduce evidence or argument relevant to guilt or punishment.
Commentary
Although there is authority that in-court contempts can be punished without
notice of charges or an opportunity to be heard, Ex parte Terry, . . . such a
procedure has little to commend it, is inconsistent with basic notions of
fairness, and is likely to bring disrespect upon the court. Accordingly, notice
and at least a brief opportunity to be heard should be afforded as a matter
of course. Nothing in this standard however, implies that a plenary trial of
contempt charges is required.
M 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
'5 Id. at 539.
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The Court indicated in Sacher'59 that the citing trial judge
was fully empowered to deal with criminal contempts commit-
ted in his presence, either during or at the close of the trial. 6 '
Subsequent decisions, however, expanded the concepts set out
in the Cooke opinion, announcing that in certain situations the
broad powers of the trial judge permitted by the Sacher ruling
would have to be curtailed in order to insure fair and impartial
adjudication of contempt citations. What has evolved, unfor-
tunately, is a confusing and at times unfair set of "standards"
for assessing the judge's impartiality.
The first such decision eroding Sacher came in the 1954
case of Offutt v. United States.6 ' In this case the trial judge
and defense counsel had engaged in extended, often hostile
disputes. In examining the trial record, the Court remarked:
The question with which we are concerned is not the repre-
hensibility of petitioner's conduct and the consequences he
should suffer. Our concern is with the fair administration of
justice. The record describes not a rare flare-up, not a show
of evanescent irritation-a modicum of quick temper must be
allowed even judges. The record is persuasive that instead of
representing the impersonal authority of law, the trial judge
permitted himself to become personally embroiled with the
petitioner. There was an intermittently continuous wrangle
on an unedifying level between the two. For one reason or
another the judge failed to impose his moral authority upon
the proceedings. His behavior precluded that atmosphere of
austerity which should especially dominate a criminal trial
and which is indispensable for an appropriate sense of re-
sponsibility on the part of court, counsel and jury."'2
The Court thus established the personal embroilment stan-
dard, requiring the trial judge to step down in those cases where
he has become personally involved with trial counsel in sharp
controversy and open hostility. Although the Offutt decision
has been criticized, 63 it has remained as a major limitation on
the power of the trial judge to summarily punish misconduct
,' 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
Id. at 9-12.
' 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
,SZ Id. at 17.
113 Lane, supra note 13, at 382-83.
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in his presence. The Court's ruling indicated that the trial
judge should represent the "impersonal authority of law;" if he
becomes incapable of doing so, due to an "infusion of personal
animosity" and a "lack of impartiality," justice requires that
another judge hear the contempt charges. '64
In 1971, the Court again examined the power of the citing
trial judge to rule on the contemnor's guilt or innocence. The
Court announced in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania'65 that, along
with the "personal embroilment" limitation established in
Offutt, where the trial judge was the target of bitter and gross
insults, if he waits until the end of trial to act against the
contemnor, he may not act summarily, but is obliged to have
another judge hear the case.'66 "[A] judge, vilified as was the
Pennsylvania judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a run-
ning bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to
maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudica-
tion.' ' 1 7 While urging that not every attack on a judge should
lead to his vacating the bench, Justice Douglas' opinion for the
Court held that where the attacks upon the judge are as grossly
and personally insulting as they were in this case, it should be
presumed that such remarks affected the judge's impartial-
ity.' 8 The Mayberry and Offutt decisions thus constitute major
restrictions on the power of the accusing judge to summarily
"1 348 U.S. at 16. While the Offutt ruling has remained a significant limitation
upon the trial judge's summary contempt powers, its application has not always been
simple. In Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964), the Court split as to whether the
situation revealed in the record called for implementing the "personal embroilment"
rule of Offutt. The record showed that in response to an attorney-witness' refusal to
answer a question, the judge stated, "You are not only contemptuous but disorderly
and insolent." Id. at 585. (The accused was given a hearing.) The majority felt the
record did not indicate personal embroilment requiring judicial disqualification. Id.
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg dissented: "This case is a classic example of one
situation where the judge who cites a person for contempt should not preside over the
contempt trial." Id. at 592. The case serves as an example of the Court being widely
split as to whether the trial judge was embroiled in a disqualifying controversy with
the contemnor.
165 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
"I Id. at 463-64. This decision does allow a judge to act summarily, if he does so
immediately, even if he is insulted. Id. at 463, 466. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970).




dispose of contempt citations at the close of trial.
In another 1971 decision, Johnson v. Mississippi,'9 the
Supreme Court inserted an additional element into the judicial
impartiality standard. Here, the petitioner was a civil rights
worker charged with criminal contempt by Judge Perry, who
subsequently presided at a hearing to decide the petitioner's
guilt. After being found guilty of contempt, Johnson asserted
that the judge had evidenced, by his prior conduct, prejudice
against him, his attorneys, civil rights workers, their organiza-
tion, and movements in general. Further, between the time the
judge cited Johnson for contempt and his adjudication of John-
son's guilt, Johnson and the judge were involved in federal
court litigation concerning the judge's prejudice in the selec-
tion of jurors, litigation which the judge lost. Based upon the
claimed prejudice, Johnson argued that the judge should not
have adjudicated his guilt in the contempt case. The Supreme
Court again acknowledged the trial judge's power of "instant
action" to punish for contempt in order to maintain courtroom
order. Here, however, the judge's action was delayed rather
than instantaneous, thus removing the maintenance of order
rationale. The Court then evaluated the propriety of Judge
Perry himself deciding the petitioner's guilt, and concluded
that the petitioner should have been afforded a hearing before
another judge. In reaching this conclusion the Court stated:
[W]e do not rely solely on the affidavits filed by the lawyers
reciting intemperate remarks of Judge Perry concerning civil
rights litigants. Beyond all that was the fact that Judge Perry
immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was a de-
fendant in one of petitioner's civil rights suits and a losing
party at that. From that it is plain that he was so enmeshed
in matters involving petitioner as to make it most appropri-
ate for another judge to sit. Trial before "an unbiased judge"
is essential to due process. "'
The Johnson case adds a new dimension to the Offutt and
Mayberry decisions. It is concerned, at least in part, with a
judge's attitudes and adverse position towards the alleged con-
"' 403 U.S. 212 (1971).
", Id. at 215-16.
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temnor, independent of any controversy, argument or insult
that might have arisen during the trial. Under Johnson, a
showing of the trial judge's adverse position and attitude to-
ward the contemnor may compel the judge to excuse himself
and have another judge hear the contempt charges.
In sum, this trio of cases requires the trial judge to step
down: (1) when he becomes "personally embroiled" with the
alleged contemnor during trial-Offutt; (2) when he has been
so grossly insulted at trial that bias must be presumed-
Mayberry; and (3) when he has evidenced a position and
attitude clearly adverse to the alleged contemnor-Johnson.
These significant limitations on the broad power of the
citing trial judge to rule in contempt cases have not gone un-
challenged. In particular, the standards of Offutt and
Mayberry have been criticized for allowing unfair and illogical
results. It has been remarked that, under the rule of these
cases, "[t]he attorney whose behavior is insufficiently provoc-
ative to embroil the judge in a manner visible on the record will
have fewer procedural rights than the attorney whose conduct
is sufficiently provocative to create a record indicating personal
embroilment." ' A similar stance is taken in Disorder in the
Court. Asserting that the standards of Mayberry are "paradox-
ical," this study goes on to comment: "[Als a defendant be-
comes less insulting and his guilt therefore less certain, his
right to the procedural safeguard of a plainly unbiased judge
becomes less sure." ' This has led some to conclude: "It would
seem more realistic to assume that no judge in a trial court
before which allegedly contemptuous acts are committed can
be sufficiently disinterested to meet the impartial tribunal test
of due process.1173 The Supreme Court has itself remarked: "It
'" Note, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 329, supra note 14, at 341. See also Note, 25 ME. L.
REV. 89, supra note 14, at 95.
112 DISORDER, supra note 14, at 226. The paradox here is that Taylor's acts were
not disrespectful enough to guarantee himself full procedural rights. If he had clearly
insulted Judge Hayes, he would have been assured a full hearing before another judge.
Without a great deal of effort one can imagine a situation where these standards could
encourage further disrespect by an already accused contemnor in order to secure
greater procedural protection.
"I Note, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, supra note 12, at 466.
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is almost inevitable that any contempt of court committed in
the presence of a judge during a trial will be an offense against
his dignity and authority. 17 4 From this position it is but a short
and logical step to the view that, in order to insure full due
process rights for the accused attorney, the trial judge citing for
contempt should step aside and have another judge rule on
guilt or innocence.
D. Taylor v. Hayes: The Kentucky Court's Approach to the
Due Process Issues
In Taylor v. Hayes,'75 the Kentucky Court of Appeals was
asked to deal with the issues of Taylor's right to notice of the
contempt charges against him and his right to a hearing before
a judge other than Judge Hayes. Taylor's basic argument was
that due process required that he be given reasonable notice
and the opportunity to be heard before an impartial judge prior
to the imposition of punishment. 176 Taylor asserted that during
the trial, as he was cited for contempt, he was not permitted
to respond; and, that at the trial's close, when Judge Hayes
sentenced him on multiple counts of contempt, his efforts to
reply were met by a threat from Judge Hayes to have him
gagged. Further, Taylor contended that Judge Hayes was "per-
sonally embroiled in controversy with [him] .. . so that he
could not impartially sit in judgement on a contempt
charge.'17  Citing Offutt, Mayberry and Johnson, as well as
"' Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952). See also DISORDER, supra note
14, at 229.
", 494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973).
'" Brief for Appellant, supra note 89, at 4-8.
'" Id. at 8. In support of his claim that Judge Hayes was not impartial, Taylor
cited the following:
The Court: (interrupting) I've heard that, Dan, a hundred times. I real-
ize what you're trying to do. You've got a job to do, but on the other hand,
it's my opinion-I think you're putting on a show. That's my opinion.
The Court: -you all were talking, and I can't blame the guy too much
for that, but on the other hand, he is getting away from the questions and
knowing him, if you give him an inch he'll take a mile. I might as well sit on
him right now.




Judge Hayes characterizes Taylor's actions as his "antics."
Taylor claims Judge Hayes continually interferred with his efforts to
question witnesses.
Mr. Taylor: Does your Honor understand that my purpose is to defend
my case?
The Court: I think that's probably what you're here for. I'm not sure.
Taylor claims Judge refused to admit when he was mistaken, refused to
inform Taylor of certain items and generally favored the prosecution.
Mr. Taylor: The objection is that he uses the word 'also' as inferring that
he's got these confessions.
The Court: Don't go through all those configurations and put on an act.
Taylor points out the racial issue which disturbed Judge Hayes during
the trial. Hayes insisted race was not involved and that Taylor was trying
to make this a racial and political case and that he, Hayes, would not permit
this.
Mr. Taylor: Thank you. Now, may I say, additionally, I have serious
doubts as to the legal correctness of the order and since we have, I have, I
don't know, five months of my life wrapped up in this case, and maybe more
than that-
The Court: (interrupting) Before its over, you might have a lot more
than that.
Mr. Taylor: Would the Court care to amplify on the meaning of that?
The Court: The Court just made a statement.
Mr. Taylor: Sir I didn't-
The Court: (interrupting) The Court just made a statement.
Mr. Taylor: Yes, sir, and I asked if the Court would care to expand on
the meaning of-
The Court: (interrupting) I don't have to explain my comments.
Id. at 10-18.
Many other exchanges are cited by Taylor to illustrate the hostile mood of the
court, but perhaps the best illustrations are Judge Hayes' closing comments:
The Court: Mr. Taylor, the Court has something to take up with you,
sir, at this time.
Mr. Taylor: Well, I'll be right here, Judge.
The Court: I've for two weeks sat here and listened to you. Now, you're
going to listen to me. Stand right here, sir.
For two weeks I've seen you put on the worst display I've ever seen an
attorney in my two years on this bench and 15 years of practicing law. You've
quoted that you couldn't do it any other way. You know our court system is
completely based upon, particularly criminal law, the Doctrine of Reasona-
ble Doubt. That's exactly what it means, reason. It doesn't mean that it's
based upon trickery; it doesn't mean that it's based upon plain confusion.
Sometimes I wonder really what your motive is, if you're really inter-
ested in the justice of your client, or if you have some ulterior motive, if
you're interested in Dan Taylor or Narvel Tinsley.
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other decisions, Taylor argued that the judge was manifestly
hostile to him and so personally involved as to deny him his due
process right to a fair adjudication."17 It was Taylor's claim that
Judge Hayes had with "actual intent" sought to "bait" him
and "abuse" him and thereby "to completely curb the defense
abilities" of Taylor, thus insuring a verdict against the murder
defendant.'
In response, Judge Hayes maintained that Taylor had
been permitted to respond and defend himself. Taylor, he said,
"was given ample and adequate opportunity to be heard in
defense and mitigation."'' 0 The Judge 'further asserted that
"nothing in the record shows that [he] . . . was personally
embroiled in a controversy with appellant so as to prevent an
impartial judgement in a contempt case."'' Judge Hayes' at-
torneys contended that Taylor's allegations of bias and lack of
impartiality were "completely unfounded and patently ab-
It's a shame that this court has to do something that the Bar Association
of this State should have done a long time ago.
As far as a lawyer is concerned, you're not. I want the jury to hear this;
I want the law students of this community to hear this, that you're not the
rule, you're the exception to the rule.
Mr. Taylor: (interrupting) Thank you.
The Court: I want them to understand that your actions should not be
their actions because this is not the way that a court is conducted. This is
not the way an officer of a court should conduct itself. [sic].
Mr. Taylor: I would respond to you, sir-
The Court: (interrupting) You're not responding to me on anything.
Mr. Taylor: (interrupting) Oh yes, I will.
The Court: No, you're not either.
Mr. Taylor: Yes, I will.
The Court: The sentence is on Count One-
Mr. Taylor: (interrupting) Unless you intend to gag me-
The Court: (interrupting) I'll do that-
Mr. Taylor: (interposing) My lawyers will respond to you-
The Court: (interposing) I'll do that, sir.
Id. at 28-29.
Judge Hayes then proceeded to cite Taylor on nine counts of contempt and sentence
him to 54 months in prison.
Id. at 9.
" Id. at 10. Taylor also argued that Judge Hayes viewed himself as under a
personal attack, pointing to the denial of bail, the Judge's attempt to disbar him and
to the severity of the sentence imposed as additional factors revealing Judge Hayes'
bias. Id. at 21-22.
25 Brief for Appellee, supra note 91, at 10.




The Court of Appeals rejected Taylor's claims that his due
process rights had been violated by denial of notice or a hearing
before an unbiased judge. The Court made it clear that, in its
view, Taylor was at all times aware of the nature of the con-
tempt charges against him and was in no position to claim
otherwise."1 Further, the Court apparently reached the conclu-
sion that any response permitted by Judge Hayes was wholly
adequate to conform to due process requirements.'84 The opin-
ion, however, failed to mention Taylor's efforts to respond dur-
ing the heated confrontation at the trial's end. The Court also
refused to accept the arguments that due process, as outlined
in Offutt, Mayberry and Johnson, commanded that Judge
Hayes step aside in deciding the contempt charges. Discussing
at length the Ofjutt case, the Court concluded that, unlike the
situation in that case, here "there is no evidence of personal
embroilment or any type of controversy with Taylor.""'8 One
source of some difficulty for the Court, however, was Judge
Hayes' closing remarks concerning Taylor's conduct, remarks
similar in nature to those made by the trial judge in the Offutt
case. In Offutt the Supreme Court had pointed to these state-
ments as revealing the judge's true bias against the accused
contemnor. Nevertheless, the Kentucky Court did not
recognize Judge Hayes' statements "as clearly demonstrating
bias." Instead, these remarks and threats were characterized
by the Court as "more akin to a declaration of a charge against
Taylor based upon the Judge's observations and not a constitu-
tionally disqualifying prejudgment of guilt.""' 6 The Court
found that although the judge's comments were inappropriate,
in light of Taylor's "obvious guilt," they did not demonstrate
sufficient bias to demand disqualification." 7
The Court further concluded that under the rule of dis-
"' Id. at 13. The Judge asserted that he had shown commendable restraint
throughout the trial and that Taylor's arguments alleging bias were sustained only by
lifting parts of the record out of context. Id.
"' 494 S.W.2d at 741-42.
I" Id. at 744.
185 Id.
1' Id.
" Id. at 745.
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qualification set out in Mayberry, Judge Hayes was not re-
quired to excuse himself. Although Mayberry requires a judge
who has been subjected to bitter and harsh personal attacks to
disqualify himself in any related contempt proceedings, in this
case the Court stated: "It is crystal clear from the record that
at no time did Daniel Taylor ever indulge in any personal at-
tack upon the Judge." '188
In arriving at its decision that Judge Hayes could, under
present Supreme Court standards, adjudicate Taylor's con-
tempt charges, the Kentucky Court of Appeals relied heavily
on the case of Ungar v. Sarafite.5 9 Although the Ungar decision
was a debatable ruling by a closely divided Supreme Court, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals was convinced that it clearly justi-
fied Judge Hayes' actions."'
The Kentucky Court's decision demonstrates the inade-
quacy of the Offutt-Mayberry standards. The "personal em-
broilment" test is elusive. Ungar, the case relied upon by the
Court of Appeals to illustrate a lack of personal embroilment,
was disputed by three Supreme Court Justices, who reached a
diametrically opposite conclusion from a reading of the same
record and remarks. Thus, this standard may not be particu-
larly well suited as a guide to proper appellate review. Sec-
ondly, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Taylor was
not so insulting to Judge Hayes as to call into force the
Mayberry ruling graphically illustrates the inadequacy of that
standard. Not only may such a standard encourage attorney
disrespect, but it, in effect, turns due process on its head by
giving those more clearly guilty of gross insults greater proce-
dural safeguards and assurances of impartiality than those
whose guilt is less apparent. Thus, the view can be reached,
from an examination of the Kentucky application of the Offutt-
Mayberry standards, that those standards are inadequate, con-
tradictory, confusing and should be replaced by a more logical
and fair rule.
lu Id. at 744.
' ' 376 U.S. 575 (1964).




E. Taylor v. Hayes: The Supreme Court's Decision on the
Due Process Issues
In the arguments both for and against the granting of cer-
tiorari, major issues arose as to whether due process of law
mandated that Taylor be provided notice of the specific
charges against him and an opportunity to defend himself at a
hearing before another judge. Taylor argued that he was never
afforded proper notice of the charges against him and that he
was wrongfully prevented from defending himself.191 Further,
Taylor asserted that the events both during and at the close of
the trial clearly revealed Judge Hayes' bias.192
Judge Hayes responded that due process had indeed been
afforded Taylor. 9 ' Citing several decisions for the proposition
that in a case of direct contempt committed in open court,
notice and a hearing were not required, Judge Hayes main-
tained that Taylor had been given more than his due, since he
had been permitted to make some response. 94 The judge also
contended that his conduct evidenced no unfairness or bias.
195
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court specifically
chose to deal with the notice-hearing issue, as well as the issue
of trial judge disqualification. 99 In doing so, the Court accepted
the opportunity to examine some of its prior decisions, particu-
larly Sacher, as to the need for proper notice and a hearing in
criminal contempt cases. The briefs submitted by the parties
contained exhaustive argumentation on these issues, and, the
Court's decision, to a limited extent, reflected these argu-
ments.
The opinion of the Court, 97 authored by Justice White,
clearly indicated that due process of law requires that the alleg-
edly contemptuous attorney be given specific notice of the
"I Petition, supra note 105, at 17-19.
192 Id. at 8.
,'3 Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Response].
"', Id.
"I Id. at 9-11.
1' 414 U.S. 1063 (1973). For the text of the questions certified, see text accompa-
nying note 33 supra.
197 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
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charges against him and some occasion to speak in response.
Upon its review of the record, the Court concluded that these
fundamental requirements had not been met, even though
Taylor had been allowed to respond at points during the trial. '
The Court placed particular emphasis on exchange at the close
of the trial, when the judge sentenced Taylor and, with overt
threats, denied him any opportunity to speak. "This proce-
dure," Justice White concluded, "does not square with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'99 The opinion,
however, limited its coverage to situations where the adjudica-
tion of the contempt citation against the attorney is delayed
until the close of trial."0 In such circumstances, the Court
ruled, the "preservation of order" rationale supporting judg-
ment without notice or hearing is not present.2 0 1 The opinion
did not reach cases were the trial judge cites and punishes
immediately for a contempt committed in his presence, for the
purpose of maintaining courtroom order. The Court also dis-
counted the contention that^ adjudication without notice or a
hearing can be justified on the basis of conservation of judicial
resources. As Justice White wrote: "Due process cannot be
measured in minutes and hours or dollars and cents.
'2 2
The substance of the Court's holding is reflected in the
following statement:
[B]efore an attorney is finally adjudicated in contempt and
sentenced after trial for conduct during trial, he should have
reasonable notice of the specific charges and opportunity to
be heard in. his own behalf. This is not to say, however, that
a full-scale trial is appropriate. Usually, the events have oc-
curred before the judge's own eyes and a reporter's transcript
is available. But the contemnor might at least urge, for exam-
ple, that the behavior at issue was not contempt but the
acceptable conduct of an attorney representing his client; or
he might present matters in mitigation or otherwise attempt




,, Id. at 496-97.
" Id. at 497.
" Id. at 497-98.
1" Id. at 497.
202 Id. at 500.
" Id. at 488-89. See also id. at 500, n.9.
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The ruling thus apparently upholds the power of the trial judge
to punish summarily without notice or a hearing, during the
trial's progress. However, if the judge delays adjudication of
the alleged contempt until the close of the trial, he must give
the accused contemnor notice of the charges against him and
some occasion to respond, although this need not be a full trial.
This holding overrules; at least in part, the Sacher decision,
which had been read as permitting the trial judge to punish an
attorney for contempt at the completion of the trial without
notice or a hearing."4
The Court's distinction between contempt sanctions im-
posed during the trial and those imposed at its conclusion, with
regard to the right to notice and a hearing, seems to be mis-
taken. The need to preserve courtroom order, which is the basis
of that distinction, is an inadequate justification for dispensing
with such rudimentary elements of due process as notice and
a hearing. Whether the trial judge immediately cites for con-
tempt or delays until the close of trial, there is simply no
reason to believe that the cause of order would suffer if the
accused contemnor is afforded notice of his specific offense and
some chance to be heard in response.2"5 Although the Court's
decision in Taylor v. Hayes does not go that far, the decision
does make it clear that when the trial judge cites an attorney
at the close of trial for allegedly contumacious conduct during
the trial (which is the normal procedure for dealing with attor-
ney misconduct), the lawyer must be given notice and an op-
portunity to be heard, even if such a hearing is not a full-scale
trial. Perhaps in future decisions the Court will see its way
clear to rule that these basic elements of due process must also
be afforded to the contemnor cited and punished during the
course of the trial.
In resolving the issue of the propriety of Judge Hayes him-
self deciding Taylor's guilt, the Supreme Court rejected the
"I4 This is the reading Justice Rehnquist gives Sacher in his dissent. Id. at 524.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
211 Part of the Court's rationale in permitting notice and a hearing where adjudica-
tion of the contempts is delayed until the close of trial appears to be a fear of an abuse
of the contempt power. Id. at 500. The potential for abuse is equally present and
perhaps greater where the judge acts immediately to punish for contempt.
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stance of the Kentucky Court and the arguments of Judge
Hayes, that under established standards the judge properly
ruled on these contempt charges. Although it agreed with the
Kentucky Court's opinion that Taylor's conduct was not such
as would invoke the Mayberry "personal attack" standards,"'
the Supreme Court was convinced that the trial record clearly
evidenced the "personal embroilment" of Judge Hayes:
With these considerations in mind, we have examined the
record in this case and it appears to us that respondent did
become embroiled in a running controversy with petitioner.
Moreover, as the trial progressed, there was a mounting dis-
play of an unfavorable personal attitude toward petitioner,
his ability and his motives, sufficient so that the contempt
issue should have been finally adjudicated by another
judge.'
In taking this position, the Court referred to specific sec-
tions of the trial record as revealing the personal embroilment
of Judge Hayes. Of particular concern to Justice White were
certain of the judge's disparaging remarks about Taylor and
the confrontation which occurred at the trial's end. As further
indicia of bias, Justice White noted the judge's disbarring of
Taylor, the refusal of the judge to grant Taylor bail pending his
appeal, and the magnitude of the sentence initially imposed in
the case. °8
The Court also commented on the respondent's reliance
upon Ungar v. Sarafite,0 9 rejecting the judge's claim that the
Ungar case supported his actions here. The majority felt that
in Ungar, the judge did not act summarily either during or at
the close of the trial, but instead afforded the contemnor notice
and an opportunity to be heard. The Ungar proceedings were,
in the Court's view, conducted dispassionately and with the
requisite impartiality.2 0 In the Taylor case, however, no notice
or hearing was granted to the contemnor and the judge's sen-
tencing at the close of trial was conducted in a highly emotional
"I' Id. at 501.
27 Id. at 501-02.
2" Id. at 502.
2- 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
"1 418 U.S. at 503.
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and unjudicial atmosphere. The Court concluded that the
Taylor record unquestionably revealed a situation of judicial
embroilment, which, in the light of established standards,
called for Judge Hayes to refrain from adjudicating the con-
tempt charges he had leveled against Daniel Taylor.2 11
The Court's ruling on the issue of judicial disqualification
in contempt cases, like its ruling on the notice-hearing issue,
is limited in nature. The decision does not amplify or alter the
guidelines set out in Offutt, Mayberry and Johnson; it simply
applies them. Although Taylor reflects the inherent deficien-
cies of these standards, the Court declined to completely re-
examine the summary contempt power issue, in terms of either
judicial disqualification or the notice hearing issue.
However, just as the due process arguments in support of
granting a contemnor notice and a hearing refute the Court's
limitation of these rights to post-trial contempt adjudications,
so do they refute the Court's continued recognition of the sum-
mary contempt power. Again it should be observed that princi-
ples fundamental to our legal system demand an impartial
tribunal in all criminal cases. The arguments in support of
allowing the judge citing for contempt to also adjudicate guilt
or innocence are inadequate. Such a power is unnecessary to
preserve order and its abuse is uncured by appellate review.
The possibility of conserving some judicial resources certainly
does not justify such a departure from basic constitutional
principles. Moreover, the Court's efforts to grant a contemnor
an impartial tribunal by way of the Offutt-Mayberry guidelines
are wholly insufficient.
Thus, in order to make justice in fact coincide with the
appearance of justice, the better rule would be to eliminate the
summary contempt power altogether. With the potential for
judicial abuse equally present, whether the judge acts to pun-
ish misconduct immediately during trial or only after the trial,
the more acceptable course to follow would be to have the trial
judge simply cite for contempt and then, following the trial,
upon proper notice, grant the accused contemnor a hearing




stantive contempt power, while granting the alleged contemnor
the basic elements of procedural due process.
V. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
The right of an individual accused of contempt to have his
guilt or innocence ruled upon by a jury raises many questions
of both a constitutional, and in the Taylor case, a statutory
nature. Some have argued that from both an historical and a
legal viewpoint it is necessary for a jury to consider an individ-
ual's guilt of criminal contempt.
A. The Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
On the constitutional plane, early decisions by the Su-
preme Court indicated that an individual accused of criminally
contumacious trial conduct was not entitled to have a jury
decide his case. 2 In the important 1958 case, Green v. United
States,"' Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, took the
position that the Supreme Court "[1]n a long and unbroken
line of decisions involving contempts ranging from misbehavior
in court to disobedience of court orders [has established] be-
yond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to
jury trial as a matter of constitutional right." ' Viewing the
issue in terms of historical developments and the "unique char-
acter" of criminal contempts, the Court's majority concluded:
"Against this historical background, the Court has never de-
viated from the view that the constitutional guarantee of trial
by jury for 'crimes' and 'criminal prosecutions' was not in-
tended to reach criminal contempts."215
In his landmark dissent in Green, Justice Black, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, rejected the major-
ity's reasoning. Justice Black disputed the idea that criminal
contempts were for some reason not to be regarded as crimes.
22 See, e.g., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914); In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895); Savin, 131 U.S. 278 (1889).
213 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
214 Id. at 183.
211 Id. at 186. For an interesting "checklist" supporting the denial of a jury trial




By historical analysis, he concluded that criminal contempt
was properly viewed as a crime and should procedurally and
constitutionally be treated as such."'6 Looking to the basic
foundations of our society, the Constitution and the Declara-
tion of Independence, Mr. Justice Black asserted that it was
totally inconsistent and unsupported by evidence to claim that
the founding fathers intended criminal contempt to be ex-
cluded from the purview of the sixth amendment. Finally, he
rejected the idea that denial of a jury trial in contempt cases
was necessary to preserve judicial order, or that economy and
necessity themselves were sufficient to justify withholding a
jury trial in cases of criminal contempt. "In the last analysis,"
Justice Black stated:
there is no justification in history, in necessity, or most im-
portant in the Constitution for trying those charged with vio-
lating a court's decree in a manner wholly different from
those accused of disobeying any other mandate of the state.
It is significant that neither the Court nor the Government
makes any serious effort to justify such differentiation except
that it has been sanctioned by prior decisions. Under the
Constitution courts are merely one of the coordinate agencies
which hold and exercise governmental power. Their decrees
are simply another form of sovereign directive aimed at guid-
ing the citizen's activity. I can perceive nothing which places
these decrees on any higher or different plane than the laws
of Congress or the regulation of the Executive insofar as pun-
ishment for their violation is concerned. There is no valid
reason why they should be singled out for an extraordinary
and essentially arbitrary mode of enforcement. Unfortunately
judges and lawyers have told each other the contrary so often
that they have come to accept it as the gospel truth. In my
judgment trial by the same procedures, constitutional and
otherwise, which are extended to criminal defendants in all
other instances is also wholly sufficient for the crime of con-
tempt."7
21 Id. at 193-219 (Black, J., dissenting).
2,7 Id. at 218-19. Others who have argued that, from both an historical and a legal
viewpoint, a jury should be necessary to decide an individual's guilt of criminal con-
tempt include Dobbs, supra note 8, at 231; Hermann, supra note 14, at 603; and
Kutner, supra note 14, at 3-7.
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The Green decision, although challenged and altered to
some extent in cases such as United States v. Barnett"' and
Cheff v. Schnackenberg," ' survived until 1968. In that year the
Court decided Bloom v. Illinois,'2 which announced that in
certain instances the alleged contemnor's right to a jury trial
was constitutionally mandated. After reconsidering, in light of
more recent rulings,22' its earlier position denying any such
constitutional right, the Court concluded: "[S]erious con-
tempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are
subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution, now
binding on the States, and that the traditional rule is constitu-
tionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty contempts
to be tried without honoring a demand for a jury trial.
'222
The reasoning here that criminal contempt "is a crime in
the ordinary sense," in that it is a public wrong punishable by
a fine or imprisonment which serves the same purpose as and
is indistinguishable from other criminal convictions, revealed
a distinct change in the Court's orientation. Based upon this
concept the Court decided that the constitutional provisions
governing conventional criminal prosecutions applied to crimi-
21S 376 U.S. 681 (1963). In Barnett the Supreme Court upheld the Green decision's
denial of a constitutional right to a jury trial in contempt cases. However, the Court
indicated the possibility of some distinction between "petty" and "serious" criminal
contempts in determining a jury trial right. Id. at 694-95. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg dissented, believing that criminal contempts
should be treated like other crimes, in terms of right to a jury trial.
211 384 U.S. 373 (1966). In Cheff, the Court, pursuant to its supervisory authority
over lower federal courts, established a right to jury trial in federal criminal contempt
cases where the penalty imposed exceeded six months. This rule was based upon the
idea that the six-month line distinguished "serious" and "petty" offenses. It did not
establish a constitutional right, binding on state courts in this area. Because Cheff
received a sentence of six months, he had no right to a jury trial in this case. Justices
Stewart and Harlan concurred in the result denying the right to a jury trial here, but
vigorously opposed the federal supervisory ruling. They argued that all criminal con-
tempts should be adjudicated without a jury, in accordance with traditional practice.
Id. at 382. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, rejecting the six-month
rule as the sole gauge of a contempt's seriousness. Id. at 384.
= 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
n' The rulings of most importance were United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681
(1964); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
212 391 U.S. at 198.
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nal contempt as well.23 The Court held, however, that under
the sixth and fourteenth amendments, this right to a jury trial
applies only to "serious" cases of criminal contempt, with the
usual method of ascertaining seriousness based upon the pen-
alty actually imposed. 4 If the trial court sentences the contem-
nor to a period of imprisonment in excess of six months, the
contempt is presumed to be serious and a jury trial must be
afforded by both federal and state courts. 25 The Bloom deci-
sion clearly rejected the reasoning of Green in establishing the
requirement of a jury trial in cases of "serious" criminal con-
tempt and served as a source for the so-called "six-month"
rule, which has been the subject of considerable controversy.
One difficulty which arose out of the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Bloom centered upon application of the six-month rule,
under which the penalty actually imposed was to serve as the
gauge of the contempt's "seriousness," with a penalty in excess
of six months as the line of demarcation on the right to a jury
trial. Some felt that this rule was only one factor to consider
in assessing the seriousness of the contemnor's conduct, on the
theory that the rule set out was at best arbitrary and unfair.226
'z Id. at 201-02. The Court went on to state:
Indeed, in contempt cases an even more compelling argument can be made
for providing a right to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary exercise
of official power. Contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often
strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's tempera-
ment. Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge,
it frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference
with the judicial process or with the duties of officers of the Court.
Id. at 202. Justice White's Bloom opinion justified restricting a trial judge's power to
proceed against an alleged contemnor without a jury trial because of the potential for
abuse of the contempt power. The Court held that the contemnor, like someone ac-
cused of any other crime, has the right to benefit from all of the procedural safeguards
our judicial system has developed. Id. at 208.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198, 211. See also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v.
United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) (cases further developing the six month rule). For
a discussion of the Court's ruling in Bloom see DISORDER, supra note 14, at 222.
2 In addition to the criticism of the six-month rule by Justices Douglas and Black
in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), see their renewed attack on the rule
in the Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74 (1970). Judge Edward Hill, of the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, criticized the rule in his dissent in Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d
161, 163 (Ky. 1972). Hill found the rule to be "arbitrary and unrealistic" but felt that
his protest would "reverberate as a pop gun." Id.
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Others, however, read this as an established and inflexible
guideline, a view supported by the cases subsequent to
Bloom .22
Yet another problem with the Bloom decision developed
out of the potential for abuse of the six-month guideline
through the use of multiple short-term sentences to be served
consecutively. If a trial judge cited an individual for contempt
at several points during a trial and, for each such "separate"
act of contempt imposed a six-month sentence, with each of the
sentences to be served consecutively rather than concurrently,
the sentence actually imposed would easily exceed six months.
In this way, the Bloom rule would be satisfied, at least, in form,
and the accused contemnor would be denied a jury trial.2 8
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147
(1969).
21 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506 (1974), a companion case to Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), the
major decision in the area of multiple, consecutive sentences was United States v.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). The Court in Seale was faced with the problem of
aggregated short-term contempt sentences which when totaled exceeded six months,
but which when considered separately were each within the six-month limit. In answer
to the argument that such a situation did not require a jury trial, the federal appellate
court responded: "[Wlhere the trial judge waits to act until a mistrial or end of a trial,
consecutively imposed sentences for contemptuous conduct occurring during the
course of the trial must be cumulated to determine the defendant-contemnor's right
to a jury trial." Id. at 356. Thus, the Court held that consecutive contempt sentences
must be aggregated to determine the right to a jury trial. The Seale ruling, however,
was limited. The Court, fearing that the imposition of a six-month contempt sentence
during the trial would exhaust the trial judge's power to control courtroom conduct if
aggregation was required, concluded that when a trial judge acts immediately to pun-
ish contumacious conduct by means of the summary power, the sentences imposed
may be considered separately, thus precluding a jury trial. Here, as in the case of right
to notice and hearing, a court made a crucial distinction between immediate action
by the trial judge and punishment imposed only at the close of the trial. The rationale
here, too, was the questionable belief that somehow the potential for abuse of the
contempt power would be greater following the trial than immediately after the alleg-
edly offensive act.
This effort to distinguish between aggregation of post-trial contempt citations and
immediately punished citations during trial, in order to determine the right to a jury
trial, has been criticized. In DISORDER, supra note 14, at 223, the following observation
is made:
In light of the strong policies enunciated by the Supreme Court in favor of a
jury trial in serious criminal cases, we do not agree that aggregation should
be required only at the end of trial. The opportunity for abuse is also present
when summary contempt is imposed at once; a judge can tailor the punish-
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B. Taylor v. Hayes: The Kentucky Court's Decision on the
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
The issue of whether the defendant was entitled to a jury
trial also arose in Taylor v. Hayes. Although the Kentucky
Court of Appeals acknowledged the Supreme Court's jury trial
rule established in Bloom, by a curious path of reasoning the
Kentucky judges concluded that Daniel Taylor was not consti-
tutionally entitled to a jury trial.2 '9
Originally, Judge Hayes had ordered Taylor to serve the
individual sentences consecutively, resulting in a term of im-
prisonment totaling 54 months. Later, however, the judge is-
sued an amended judgment which not only brought each indi-
vidual contempt citation within the six-month limit of Bloom,
the sentences thus aggregating to 41 months in prison, but also
failed to specify whether the sentences were to be served con-
currently or consecutively. In his subsequent brief to the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, the judge argued that so long as no
single contempt citation was punished by more than six
months imprisonment, an aggregate sentence in excess thereof
did not require a jury trail.2° The obvious import of the judge's
argument was that the corrected judgment, like the original,
required the sentences to be served consecutively, and that he
was empowered to so act without the intervention of a jury.
This assertion clearly demonstrated one of the potential abuses
possible under the Bloom ruling. Judge Hayes claimed that the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Seale,31 requiring aggregation of
multiple contempt sentences, was distinguishable from the
Taylor situation and that, in any event, the Seale ruling was
not applicable in Kentucky courts. 2 He concluded that in this
state a trial judge could act in this manner without impaneling
a jury to consider the case.23 The judge also contended that a
ment levied for each infraction to the six month maximum and nevertheless
conclude the trial with punishments ranging far beyond six months. We
believe that whenever the total punishment for contempt exceeds that pe-
riod, only a jury can impose it.
m 494 S.W.2d 737, 746 (1973).
21 Brief for Appellee, supra note 91, at 14-24.
'1 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
n2 For a discussion of the Seale decision on this issue see note 228 supra.
2u Brief for Appellee, supra note 91, at 20.
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jury trial in such a case should be denied because a jury simply
was not qualified to deal properly with cases of criminal con-
tempt."
Taylor's brief to the Court of Appeals relied upon a num-
ber of cases, including Bloom and Seale, to support his claim
for a jury trail. 5 He argued that where the sentence actually
imposed was in excess of six months, there was a constitutional
right to have the case decided by a jury. Maintaining that the
separate sentences imposed by Judge Hayes were to be served
consecutively, Taylor asserted that his punishment actually
exceeded three years in prison, a fact mandating a jury trial.
Taylor's attorneys urged that in the case of multiple contempt
citations, where the potential for judicial abuse was so great,
the rationale of the Seale case, requiring the numerous separate
sentences to be considered as a single unit, should be fol-
lowed.238 Taylor's lawyers also responded to the claim that a
jury was inadequate to handle such a case, noting that the
basic reasoning of the Bloom case rejected this argument and
that claims of wasted time and additional expense necessitated
by a jury trial did not justify dispensing with such an essential
right.
237
Apparently accepting the Seale rule requiring jury inter-
vention where several contempt sentences to be served consec-
utively cumulate in excess of six months, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals nevertheless proceeded to hold that Taylor was not
entitled to a jury trial. 8 Despite the intention of Judge Hayes
to impose consecutive sentences in the corrected judgment (an
intention apparent in his written argument to the Court), the
Kentucky Court concluded that, because the judge had neg-
lected to specify this in the amended judgment, Kentucky law
2 Id. at 21.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 89, at 24-26. See also Reply Brief for Appellant
at 9-11, Taylor v. Hayes, 494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief
for Appellant].
"I Brief for Appellant, supra note 89, at 25-26.
2 Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 235, at 11.
494 S.W.2d at 746. See Local 1667, United Auto Workers v. Kawneer Co., Inc.,
490 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1973); Miller v. Vettiner, 481 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1972) (recent
Kentucky cases accepting the idea that a penalty for criminal contempt in excess of
six months may not be imposed without a jury trial).
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dictated that the sentences were to be served concurrently.
With no single sentence in the corrected judgment greater than
six months, the total penalty imposed was thus six months. In
this manner, the Court brought the conviction within the six-
month limit of Bloom, avoided the Seale problem, and circum-
vented a jury trial. 39 As will be discussed subsequently, the
validity of the Court's reasoning on this point is highly ques-
tionable. Moreover, the Court's action reveals yet another of
the potential abuses latent in the Bloom rules. In any event,
Taylor was denied a jury trial and his sentences was set at six
months.
C. Taylor v. Hayes: The Supreme Court Ruling on the
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
In its grant of certiorari in Taylor v. Hayes, the Supreme
Court chose to consider the jury trial issue. Of particular con-
cern to the Court was the fact that although Judge Hayes had
initially imposed consecutive contempt sentences far exceeding
the six-month rule, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals
took subsequent actions apparently designed to reduce the
sentence to conform with the Bloom limitations, thus defeating
the claim for a jury trial.2
4
In his argument to the Supreme Court, Taylor renewed the
claim that he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. His
arguments were necessarily altered, however, due to the posi-
tion taken by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Taylor claimed
that there was no six-month rule as such, asserting that no
decision of the Court had established this figure as the sole
criterion of an offense's "seriousness" and hence the right to a
jury trial. Rather, he argued, the proper concern was with
"objective criteria of seriousness," with such factors as the
"1 494 S.W.2d at 746-47. Apparently, despite the arguments in his original brief
to the Court, Judge Hayes adopted the Court's reasoning that the corrected sentence
was to be served concurrently. See Response to Petition for Rehearing at 1, Taylor v.
Hayes, 494 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1973).
240 414 U.S. 1063 (1973). For the complete text of the questions certified see text
accompanying note 33 supra. On the same day the Court granted certiorari in the case
of Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 414 U.S. 1063 (1973), to consider the issue raised in Seale




magnitude of the initial sentence imposed and statements by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals that Taylor's conduct threat-
ened and sought to destory the entire judicial system of Ken-
tucky indicating the actual seriousness with which Taylor's
actions were viewed.24' It was further maintained that even if
the Supreme Court were to hold that a six-months rule existed,
a jury trial should be granted in this case. The basis of this
argument was that "the entitlement to a jury trial should at-
tach at the time the sentence is originally imposed" and that,
therefore, "the right to a jury trial should not be able to be
defeated, as it was here, by subsequent modification of the
sentence on the part of the trial judge or the reviewing court
to bring it within a 'six month rule.' "242
In response, the attorneys for Judge Hayes argued that,
since six months was the penalty actually imposed, the con-
tempt was simply not serious. Consequently, based on a sen-
tence within the six-month line, no right to a jury trial should
be recognized. The judge asserted that six months was indeed
the fixed line of demarcation as to seriousness, and that the
initial imposition of a more lengthy sentence and a subsequent
reduction by the appellate court did not establish a jury trial
right nor fix the offense as serious. 243 Judge Hayes argued at
some length concerning the right of an appellate court to
modify a trial court judgment, apparently insisting that in ess-
ence the original sentence amounted to no more than a "cleri-
cal mistake" as to certain details.
Justice White's opinion on the jury trial issue substantially
rejected Taylor's arguments. At the outset, the Court refused
"I Petition, supra note 105, at 9-14; Reply to Brief in Opposition to Petition at 3-
4, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Brief for Petitioner at 19-29, Taylor v. Hayes,
418 U.S. 488 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 240, at 28-29. Taylor made two other broad
argumemts regarding the right to a jury trial in contempt cases. His lawyers asked the
Court to rule that criminal contempt by its very nature should be regarded as a serious
offense calling for a jury trial. Taylor claimed that a contumacious offense, as an
offense against the court and judge, called for a jury in all such cases to ensure impar-
tiality. Further Taylor asked the Justices to hold that the threat of imprisonment itself
was sufficient to establish an offense as serious, thus entitling the accused to a jury
trial. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 26 (1972).
2"2 Brief for Respondent at 33-35, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
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to hold that all criminal contempts must be tried to a jury. In
addition, the Court indicated that it would not accept Taylor's
assertion that there was no six-month rule.
Petitioner contends that any charge of contempt of court,
without exception, must be tried to a jury. Quite to the con-
trary, however, our cases hold that petty contempt like other
petty criminal offenses may be tried without a jury and that
contempt of court is a petty offense when the penalty actually
imposed does not exceed six months or a longer penalty has
not been expressly authorized by statute.
244
The Court concluded that although the initially imposed sen-
tence was in excess of six months, by the later modification of
the judgment, the total sentence imposed was six months. As
a result, the contempt citations "constituted petty offenses and
trial by jury was not required. '2 45 Thus, according to Justice
White's opinion, the majority of the Court "remain firmly com-
mitted to the proposition that criminal contempt is not a crime
of the sort that requires the right to jury trial regardless of the
penalty involved.
'246
As the Court's grant of certiorari had indicated, an issue
of some concern was the use of appellate modification to bring
the contempt sentences within the six-month limit, thereby
avoiding a jury trial. Taylor had argued that once a sentence
in excess of six months was imposed, the right to a jury trial
attached and could not be defeated by appellate review or al-
teration. The majority opinion, however, rejected the claim
that a reviewing court could not remove the right to a jury trial
by modifying the imposed penalty.
It is argued that a State should not be permitted, after con-
viction, to reduce the sentence to less than six months and
thereby obviate a jury trial. The thrust of our decisions, how-
ever, is to the contrary: in the absence of legislative authori-
zation of serious penalties for contempt, a State may choose
to try any contempt without a jury if it determines not to
impose a sentence longer than six months. We discern no
material difference between this choice and permitting the
244 418 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
245 Id. at 495-96.
246 Id. at 496.
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State, after conviction, to reduce a sentence to six months or
less rather than to retry the contempt with a jury.... Iri
either case, the State itself has determined that the contempt
is not so serious as to warrant more than a six months
sentence.47
The validity of the majority's reasoning on the issue of
modification has been questioned.24 In his dissent, Justice
Marshall specifically rejected denial of the right to jury trial by
appellate modification. 49 Justice Marshall indicated that the
initial sentence of almost four and a half years in prison
"marked the contempt charges against petitioner as 'serious'
rather than 'petty' and called into play petitioner's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. ' 250 Characterizing Judge
Hayes' subsequent reduction of the sentence as "a transparent
effort to circumvent this Court's Sixth Amendment decisions
and to save his summary conviction of petitioner without the
necessity of airing the charges before an impartial jury," the
dissenting Justice concluded that Taylor could not "be de-
prived of his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, once it at-
tached through the imposition of a substantial sentence, by the
subsequent action of the trial court or an appellate court in
reducing the sentence."'
Justice Marshall also deplored the solidification of the
"six-month rule" apparent in Justice White's opinion. He de-
scribed the decision as "an extraordinarily rigid and wooden
application of the six-month rule," believing that the major-
ity's stance changed the nature of the rule from one based on
reason to one largely arbitrary in result.22
247 Id.
2 In Note, 1967 DUKE L.J. 632, supra note 14, at 661-62, the author argues that
the imposition of a "non-petty" punishment conclusively determines that the con-
tempt involved is serious enough to require a jury trial and that this right to a jury
trial should not be avoided by appellate modification of the initially imposed sentence.
To hold otherwise would seem illogical and arbitrary.
24, 418 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Note also that Justice Doug-
las did not join the majority in its decision denying Taylor a jury trial.
= Id.
21 Id.
212 Id. Justice Marshall felt that the arbitrariness of the solidified rule was appar-
ent in the circumstances of this case:
The very fact that such a substantial contempt sentence was imposed, and
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The majority in Taylor v. Hayes, however, was not moved
by these arguments. The Court's holding seems to establish the
six-month rule as the definite line in determining whether an
offense is serious or petty for jury trial purposes. The opinion
allows the modification and reduction of an initially imposed
sentence, even where such alteration is specifically designed to
cut off the right to a jury trial. Finally, the opinion makes it
clear that a jury trial is not required in all cases of criminal
contempt. In light of the discussion above, the Court's posture
on these points, particularly with regard to the reduction-
modification issue, seems erroneous.
The Taylor case did not answer the multiple contempt
sentence-aggregation issue which had earlier been part of the
dispute, and which was, to this time, resolved primarily by
United States v. Seale.253 In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,254 de-
cided on the same day as Taylor v. Hayes, the Supreme Court
resolved this issue.
In Codispoti the Court adopted essentially the position of
the Seale court, requiring that when the trial judge postpones
until after the trial the punishment of the accused or an attor-
ney for multiple contumacious acts, if the imposed sentences
to be served exceed six months in prison, then a jury trial must
be permitted. 5 Justice White's opinion for the majority indi-
cated that part of the rationale behind requiring this cumula-
tion for post-trial contempt sentences was a fear of arbitrary
judicial conduct. Likewise, the Court's stance was that, in ef-
fect, the supposedly separate sentences imposed constituted a
single unit, calling for aggregation of the individual sentences
to determine the penalty actually imposed. 256 As in the Seale
case, the majority of the Supreme Court made a crucial distinc-
tion here between post-trial sentencing and multiple contempt
citations imposed and punished during the course of the trial.
then reduced to the six-month maximum should be a warning to us that the
fairness of the process which petitioner has received is suspect, and that the
contempt charges involved here especially require the scrutiny of a jury trial.
Id. at 505.
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
2 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
Id. at 512.
26 Id. at 517.
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Adopting the reasoning in Seale that to require cumulation of
those contempt sentences meted out as the trial progresses
would hinder the trial judge in controlling the courtroom, the
Justices concluded that in such a case aggregation of the sepa-
rate sentences was not demanded.21 Thus, in Codispoti the
Court held that if a judge acts during trial, he may cite an
individual for contempt several times, impose for each con-
tempt a penalty of up to six months, and direct that the
sentences be served consecutively, without necessitating a jury
trial. Where, however, the judge delays punishment until the
end of trial, then to avoid arbitrary judicial action, cumulation
is necessary. In its closing remarks, the Court rejected the
suggestion that its opinion would encourage trial judges to act
during trial to punish for contempt rather than at the close of
the trial, when the judge may in fact be in a calmer and more
appropriate position to assess the seriousness of the contemp-
tuous conduct.58 Justice White suggested that appellate review
could, in any case, remedy any arbitrary action by the judge
during the trial."'
As discussed previously, certain authorities, including the
authors of Disorder in the Court,2 dispute the validity of this
sort of distinction in determining the right to a jury trial. As
in Taylor, Justice Marshall filed a separate opinion. In that
opinion, he disputed the majority's efforts to distinguish be-
tween contempt citations during the trial and those following
the trial."8' Feeling that the sixth amendment right should be
applicable in either situation, Justice Marshall rejected the
view that the potential for arbitrary action was present only
when the judge waits until after the trial to punish for con-
tempt, stating:
I completely fail to see how there is any less likelihood of such
arbitrary action by a judge when he acts summarily to punish
each allegedly contemptuous act by a defendant as it occurs
rather than awaiting the end of trial to try the contempts.
21 Id. at 514.
21 Id. at 517.
259 Id.
260 DISORDER, supra note 14.
261 418 U.S. at 519-20.
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Indeed, the Court's suggestion provides an incentive for a
trial judge to act in the heat of the moment, and thus encour-
ages the very arbitrary action which it is the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment to eliminate.2 '
Justice Marshall agreed with the Court that the penalty
actually imposed, i.e., the total penalty imposed, should deter-
mine the seriousness of the offense, but would not accept the
Court's effort to limit this rule only to post-trial situations.
While he acknowledged the importance of judicial control of
the courtroom, the basis of the majority's position, Justice
Marshall felt that this need was insufficient to permit such a
disregard of constitutional rights. 63 In closing, Justice Mar-
shall indicated that control of the courtroom could be achieved
by other devices, and that "there is no 'overriding necessity' for
repeated use of the summary contempt power against a crimi-
nal defendant to maintain order in the courtroom.""26
D. The Statutory Right to a Jury Trial
Daniel Taylor's claimed right to a jury trial was buttressed
by sources in addition to the Constitution. Kentucky statutory
law also granted Taylor the right to a jury trial.265 The Court
of Appeals, however, negated this right by ruling that the stat-
ute requiring a jury trial was unconstitutional as a "material
interference with the administration of justice."
266
The Kentucky statute requiring a jury trial in criminal
contempt cases where punishment exceeds a $30 fine or 30
hours in jail dates to 1793.217 On December 19 of that year an
act was passed "more effectually to secure the Constitutional
Rights and Privileges of the Citizens of this Commonwealth.2 16
The act specified that no judge could punish an individual for
212 Id. at 519.
23 Id. at 520-22.
254 Id.
2 KRS § 432.260(1) (1972), which provides: "A court shall not impose a fine of
more than thirty dollars ($30.00) or imprison for more than thirty (30) hours for con-
tempt without the intervention of a jury."
288 494 S.W.2d 737, 745 (Ky. 1973).
267 1 LAWS OF KENTUCKY 507 (1799); 1 LTrTELL, STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY 198
(1809).
2U 1 LAWS OF KENTUCKY 506 (1799).
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contempt by a fine in excess of ten pounds or imprisonment
exceeding one day without a jury trial.6 ' The clear intent of
this 180-year-old provision was to protect the accused individ-
ual from the arbitrary punishment of an offended judge.
Throughout its history, however, this legislative limitation
upon the summary contempt power had been questioned by
the Commonwealth's judiciary.20
The Court of Appeals first questioned the validity of the
law in the 1874 ease, In re Woolley. "We will not in this case
determine," the Court said:
whether under the Constitution, the legislative department,
under the guise of regulating proceedings in cases of con-
tempts, can take from the judiciary the power to preserve its
independence and equality by protecting itself against insults
and indignities. The right of self-preservation is an inherent
right in the courts. It is not derived from the legislature and
cannot be made to depend upon legislative will.Y
In contrast to the legislative concern for protection of the indi-
vidual and avoidance of an unfettered arbitrary power, the
Court in Woolley emphasized protection of the dignity, and the
very existence, of an independent and vital judiciary. In terms
of statutory limitations on the summary contempt power, these
21, In the preamble to this act, the rationale behind the limitations was set forth:
Whereas the government of this state is a free republican government, insti-
tuted for peace, safety, and happiness of the people, and it being contrary
to these principles that any man or body of men should have or exercise in
any case, an unlimited arbitrary power to fine and imprison for offenses
against him or themselves in any capacity whatever. And whereas it is de-
clared in the bill of rights, that the free communication of thoughts and
opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty, which right would be rendered altogether dangerous and ineffectual,
if the person or persons who might suppose him or themselves offended in
any capacity, were to possess the power to judge of the offense and inflict
the punishment. And whereas the trial by jury in all penal, as well as crimi-
nal cases, is both a safe and adequate mode of investigation and decision,
and should only be suspended in cases of the most absolute necessity. [Be
it enacted.]
Id. at 506-07.
2' For general background on the right of the legislature to regulate the contempt
power of courts, see Annot., 121 A.L.R. 215 (1939).
273 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 95, 111 (1875).
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arguments represent the basic conflicting positions.
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals expressed doubt
as to the validity of the jury trial statute in Woolley, just eight
years later, in Arnold v. Commonwealth,2 the Court indi-
cated: "While the right to punish for contempt is with the
court, we are not prepared to say that it is not subject in some
degree to legislative control."' 3 The Court found the jury trial
requirement was "in no manner objectionable. ' ' 2 4 Subsequent
cases followed the reasoning of Arnold in support of this legisla-
tive limitation. 215 Thus, in 1933 one commentator was led to
remark that "the constitutionality of the statute . is defi-
nitely established. '"
In recent years, however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
had begun to oppose such legislative curtailments of judicial
contempt powers.2 7 Finally, in Taylor v. Hayes, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the statutory requirement of a jury
trial in the case of a criminal contempt citation, where the
judge sought to impose more than a minor penalty, was an
unconstitutional obstruction of justice.28 This conclusion was
212 80 Ky. 300 (1882).
213 Id. at 302.
274 Id.
21 Armstrong v. Bryan, 273 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1954); Crook v. Schumann, 167
S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1942); Talbott v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W. 32 (Ky. 1925); Green v.
Commonwealth, 264 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1924); Riley v. Wallace, 222 S.W. 1085 (Ky. 1920);
Richardson v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W. 213 (Ky. 1911). All of these cases lend support
to the legislative limitation of a judge's summary contempt powers. For a somewhat
different position, however, see Capps v. Gore, 21 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1929).
21 Note, Crimes-Contempt by Publication, 22 Ky. L.J. 145, 151 (1933).
17 Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1972); Miller v. Stephenson, 474 S.W.2d
372 (Ky. 1971); Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971); Levisa Stone Corp. v.
Hays, 429 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1968); Teamster Local No. 783 v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
418 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1967).
The Arnett case is of particular importance here because it is cited in Taylor as
setting forth the Court's reasoning on the constitutionality of KRS § 432.260. InArnett,
KRS § 421.140 was in question. This statute limited punishment for civil contempt to
a fine of $30.00 and imprisonment of 24 hours. The Arnett court, in ruling the statute
unconsitutional, said:
The general rule is that any legislation that hampers judicial action or inter-
feres with the discharge of judicial functions is unconstitutional. However,
the rule is subject to the qualification that the legislature may put reasonable
restrictions upon constitutional functions of the court, provided that such
restrictions do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those functions.
462 S.W.2d at 946 (italics in original).
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reached despite the fact that the statute did not deprive the
courts of any inherent power to punish for contempt, but sim-
ply required the courts, before exercising this power beyond a
certain point, to submit the case to an impartial jury. The
court's power to punish had remained intact. Nevertheless, the
court chose to invalidate the statute.
At first blush the Court's conclusions seem acceptable in
light of the reasoning of earlier decisions. Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, it becomes apparent that the Court's decision is
faulty and very disturbing. What the Court holds in Taylor is
that the summary power to deal with contempt is necessary for
the administration of justice, and that the intervention of a
jury constitutes an obstruction of justice. In a state where trial
by jury is held to be constitutionally "sacred" and "inviol-
ate," 9 such an assertion by the Commonwealth's highest court
appears to be a remarkable deviation from the basic tenets of
our judicial system. Further, to view the requirement of a jury
trial as a material interference with justice, flies in the face of
the Supreme Court's Bloom decision. 0 Lastly, it is interesting
to note that while the Kentucky Court was in the process of
rejecting a 180-year-old statutory limit on judicial contempt
powers by choosing to uphold summary contempt powers,
other states have done just the reverse. 8' In this context then,
The Arnett decision was based, in turn, upon the rules set forth by the Court in
Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547, 549-50 (Ky. 1938), a decision noted for setting the
balance between the power of the legislature to regulate the courts, and the court's
power to disregard the legislative pronouncements.
See also KY. CONST. §§ 110, 126 which deal with the powers of the Court of Appeals
and the Circuit courts.
I's In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed the reasoning of Arnett v.
Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971) and Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938),
which are discussed in the preceding footnote.
2' Ky. CONST. § 7.
391 U.S. 194 (1968).
2 See State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925 (Alas. 1971) for a decision limiting the
judicial contempt power. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 51-33a (1973) for a statutory
limit on summary contempt powers. For a list of state statutes dealing with the con-
tempt power see Note, 1967 DUKE L.J. 632, supra note 14, at 654, n.84. For a discussion
of particular states' limitations on the contempt power, either statutorily or judicially,
see such articles as Robinson, Use of the Contempt Power Against Lawyers in
Michigan, 51 MICH. STATE BAR J. 659 (1972) and Snepp, The Law of Contempt in North
Carolina, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1970).
1975]
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
the Court's decision in Taylor that the requirement of a jury
trial in certain cases of criminal contempt causes a "material
interference with the administration of justice" seems unfor-
tunate and wholly incorrect.
Justice Black once dealt with the sort of argument relied
upon by the Court of Appeals, i.e., that summary powers ab-
sent a jury trial to decide contempts were necessary. This argu-
ment, he felt:
[A]ppears to rest on the assumption that the regular crimi-
nal processes, including trial by petit jury and indictment by
grand jury, will not result in conviction and punishment of a
fair share of those guilty of violating court orders, are unduly
slow and cumbersome, and by intervening between the court
and punishment for those who disobey its mandates somehow
distracts from its dignity and prestige. Obviously this argu-
ment reflects substantial disrespect for the institution of trial
by jury, although this method of trial is-and has been for
centuries-an integral and highly esteemed part of our sys-
tem of criminal justice enshrined in the Constitution itself. 2
The impact of the Kentucky Court's decision to invalidate
the statutory requirement of a jury trial in contempt cases casts
at least a partial shadow over the institution of trial by jury in
Kentucky. This decision appears unacceptable. One is left with
the distinct feeling that the Court of Appeals desired to avoid
permitting a jury trial in the case, both on a constitutional and
a statutory level, and was willing to go quite far in order to
achieve that end. The Supreme Court's decision on the consti-
tutional right to a jury trial appears equally unacceptable, in
that it allows courts to side-step an accused's right to a jury
trial by modification of the trial judge's original sentence. Judi-
cial fears of a loss of control should be set aside. Contemptuous
conduct by attorneys is not frequent, and other devices exist
by which a judge may preserve order in his court. Focusing on
the need for basic fairness, the better decision, from both statu-
tory and constitutional viewpoints, would have been to remand
the case for consideration by a jury.
211 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 214 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Taylor v. Hayes2 1 deals with several facets of criminal con-
tempt which are of considerable importance to the trial attor-
ney. The current law of contempt, as it applies to attorneys,
can be briefly summarized as follows.
What constitutes contempt: It appears that for an attor-
ney's conduct to be contemptuous some form of obstruction of
the court is necessary. Zealous representation of a client, mere
disrespect as a by-product of a hotly contested case, or unin-
tended transgression of a court's directive should not result in
a contempt citation. Such a penalty, which can so seriously
affect the trial attorney and his client, should be reserved for
those situations in which the attorney acts with some knowl-
edge and intent that his conduct will obstruct the judicial pro-
cess; it should not be utilized where he acts out of a good faith
desire to protect the interests of his client. Court decisions
indicate that in our adjudicatory system, the participants,
judges and lawyers alike, should be able to withstand the
harshness of the trial situation without becoming offended. At
the same time, the participants owe a duty to the system and
to all the parties involved to act with propriety and respect and
to always seek truth and justice. When the attorney knowingly
frustrates the ends of justice, a contempt citation is appropri-
ate and necessary; otherwise, a contempt citation is mistaken.
The right to notice and a hearing: The Supreme Court's
decision in Taylor v. Hayes establishes that if a trial judge
waits until the end of a trial to punish for contempt, the alleged
contemnor, whether he is an attorney or not, should be given
notice of the specific charges against him and an opportunity
for a hearing. Apparently, however, if the trial judge acts dur-
ing the trial to punish for contempt, he can impose punishment
without affording the accused contemnor notice or a hearing.
In order to avoid prejudicing his client, an attorney cited for
contempt is usually not dealt with until the close of the trial.
418 U.S. 488 (1974).
'' 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
405 U.S. 212 (1971).
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Thus, the attorney generally will be provided notice and a hear-
ing.
The right to have an impartial judge: In Taylor v. Hayes
the Supreme Court preserves the existing law in this area es-
tablished by such cases as Offutt,284 Johnson 5 and Mayberry.2 11
The rule appears to be that, unless it can be shown that the
trial judge acted in open conflict with the alleged contemnor,
demonstrated marked bias towards him or was so grossly in-
sulted that bias must be presumed, the judge citing for con-
tempt may also decide guilt or innocence and the appropriate
punishment for the contemnor.
The right to trial by jury: The position taken by Justice
White in Taylor and Codispoti 87 seems to solidify the six-
month rule of Bloom.288 Further, the ruling in Taylor clearly
permits a court to avoid a jury trial by the modification or
reduction of the sentence initially imposed by the trial judge.
Thus, even if the trial court imposes a penalty in excess of six
months, the trial judge or the appellate court can avoid a jury
trial by reducing the sentence to conform to the six-month
limitation of Bloom. The decision in Codispoti clearly adopts
the position taken by the Seventh Circuit in Seale,29 requiring
the cumulation of multiple contempt sentences imposed at the
end of trial to determine the accused's right to a jury trial.
However, the court has rejected cumulation of contempt sen-
tences imposed during the trial. Thus, as with the right to
notice and hearing, the right to a jury trial may hinge on
whether sentence is imposed during or after the trial. The ra-
tionale behind this distinction is to permit the trial judge to
maintain control of the courtroom. Taylor and Codispoti hold
that criminal contempt is not an offense requiring a jury trial
regardless of the penalty imposed and that the risk of imprison-
ment alone does not require trial by jury. The Court's decisions
continue to uphold summary procedures, with the most signifi-
cant new limitations coming in the form of rules for notice and
hearing and the requirement of sentence aggregation in certain
cases.
-6 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
-7 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
'' 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
"' 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
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There can be no question that a trial judge must have
effective tools with which to preserve order and insure justice
in the proceedings before him. To deny this would be to emas-
culate the judiciary. But, acknowledging the need for an effec-
tive power in the trial judge does not mandate that the power
be so structured as to deny or suspend procedural requirements
and due process principles essential to our system of justice.
This is especially true in the case of trial attorneys, who, by
their dual roles in our system, are placed in a conflicting posi-
tion in which they may easily fall into contempt. The need to
punish an attorney, or anyone else, for contemptuous conduct
does not mean that the procedure followed must be summary
in nature.
The Supreme Court's remand of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals decision in Taylor v. Hayes was fortunate, for it seems
clear that the Kentucky Court's decision was simply wrong.
Apparently, the Court of Appeals was too concerned with what
was seen as Taylor's "obvious guilt" and not with the proce-
dures followed in the case to determine that guilt.20 The law
of contempt following the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor
and Codispoti is better than before, particularly in the areas of
requiring notice, a hearing, and aggregation of multiple con-
tempt sentences. However, the Court's decisions do not go far
enough. The Court's insistence on drawing a distinction be-
tween contempt penalties imposed during the trial and those
imposed after the trial, in determining the right to notice and
a hearing as well as the right to a jury trial, is erroneous. Such
a distinction has no logical basis and there is no evidence to
show that the distinction is justified by the need for courtroom
control. Moreover, the Court's retention of the Offutt-
Mayberry standards of judicial disqualification seems unfor-
tunate. Due process and fairness demand that the judge who
cites for contempt committed in his presence should not be the
judge of guilt or innocenc6 in the case. This is true whether or
not the citing judge was "personally embroiled" or grossly in-
2" See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1952), where he emphasizes that a court's concern should be with the procedures by




sulted. In addition, the constitutional right to set the contempt
case before a jury should not be subject to the avoidance by
appellate modification permitted in Taylor. Such a right
should attach with the initial imposition of a sentence exceed-
ing six months in prison. The six-month rule also merits recon-
sideration, for although the penalty actually imposed may
serve as a useful gauge of the seriousness of an offense, the
"objective criteria of seriousness" peculiar to the individual
case might otherwise reveal the need for consideration of the
issues by a jury. Finally, some consideration should be given
to a renewed effort to place statutory limits upon the Kentucky
courts' summary contempt powers.9 ' Perhaps statutory provi-
sions with more realistic limits than $30 or 30 hours in jail
without a jury would be more acceptable to the Kentucky
Court. Such a statute should not be designed to hinder the
courts, but to balance the courts' need for control with the
equally significant need to preserve fairness and individual
rights.
The summary contempt power is an unnecessary and un-
fair aberration in our system of justice. It is a threat of great
significance to the trial attorney. While undoubtedly a judge
must have the power to deal with misconduct before him, the
power to deal with this in a summary fashion is simply unjusti-
fiable. The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Taylor u.
Hayes goes at least part-way in tempering this power. In the
future it can only be hoped that other needed changes will be
made in the law of contempt.
W. Eugene Basanta
2" The Court of Appeals decision in Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940, 946 (Ky.
1971), discussed supra note 277, indicates that "reasonable restrictions" upon the
judiciary's contempt powers by way of statutory provisions might well be acceptable
to the Court. The Kentucky General Assembly certainly should give some considera-
tion to this.
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